Decoding Inside Information by Cohen, Lauren Harry et al.
Decoding Inside Information
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation COHEN, LAUREN, CHRISTOPHER MALLOY, and LUKASZ
POMORSKI. 2012. “Decoding Inside Information.” The Journal
of Finance 67 (3) (May 21): 1009–1043. Portico. doi:10.1111/
j.1540-6261.2012.01740.x. .
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33785679
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
Decoding Inside Information — Page 1 
 
 
 
Decoding Inside Information 
 
 
LAUREN COHEN, CHRISTOPHER MALLOY, and LUKASZ POMORSKI* 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is 
predictable, identifiable “routine” insider trading that is not informative for the future 
of firms. A portfolio strategy that focuses solely on the remaining “opportunistic” 
traders yields value-weighted abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month, while 
abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero. The most informed 
opportunistic traders are local, non-executive insiders from geographically concentrated, 
poorly governed firms. Opportunistic traders are significantly more likely to have SEC 
enforcement action taken against them, and reduce trading following waves of SEC 
insider trading enforcement. 
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Investors and regulators share a common challenge: how to sift through the 
multitude of information events that bombard securities markets each day, and 
determine which events contain viable information, and which do not.  Investors in 
these markets must ascertain which of these events, and what parts of their contents, 
have insight into firm value.  Regulators, on the other hand, must work to ensure that 
information flow in the capital markets is "timely, comprehensive and accurate."1   
 A class of information events that is especially difficult to decipher is the trading 
activity of corporate insiders.  Insiders are a unique class of traders as they, by 
definition, have favored access to private information about the given firm.  Because of 
this preferential access, insiders are subject to increased scrutiny, regulation, and 
restrictions regarding their trading activities.   
Another unique aspect of insiders is that they often receive a large proportion of 
their stakes in firms through non-market transactions (e.g. stock grants).  Through 
initial ownership, stock grants, and other market transactions, insiders’ firm 
stockholdings are often a non-trivial percentage of their wealth.  Thus personal liquidity 
and diversification motives, in addition to signaling and regulatory issues, will affect the 
timing and nature of insider trades, making it more difficult for investors to interpret 
any given insider trade as informative or not.   
 The detection of illegal insider trading, meanwhile, presents an even higher 
hurdle: the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) must demonstrate that a 
person "trades a security while in possession of material nonpublic information in 
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violation of a duty to withhold the information or refrain from trading."2  The rash of 
high-profile insider trading cases in recent years, notably the government’s investigation 
into the Galleon Group in late 2009--the largest hedge fund insider trading case in U.S. 
history--indicates that the SEC continues to expend substantial resources trying to 
address this difficult problem.     
 In this paper we provide a new framework for thinking about detection and 
information flow in the capital markets.  Using a simple, novel approach, we decode 
whether there is likely to be information in a given insider’s trades.  In doing so, we 
show that there is predictable, identifiable “routine” insider trading that is not 
informative for the future of firms.  Classifying trading in this way allows us to strip 
away these uninformative signals, leaving a set of information-rich trades by 
“opportunistic” insiders that contain all of the predictive power in the insider universe. 
 Our analysis rests on the simple idea that insiders, while possessing private 
information, trade for many reasons. For example, routine sells by insiders are 
commonplace in the market, and can be driven by diversification or liquidity reasons, 
with the insider wanting to signal that he is not trading on information about the firm 
(e.g., Bill Gates, who trades in a pre-announced, routine fashion).  Routine buys, on the 
other hand, may occur after an insider receives a bonus; since bonuses are often paid out 
in the same month each year, and since insiders often receive discount plans on their 
company stock (and hence are more likely to buy the stock), insider buying in the same 
calendar month is common and often uninformative.  Thus, if one can classify ex-ante 
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those traders who make routine (and so less informative) trades, one can better identify 
the true information that insiders contain and thus develop a richer understanding of 
firm-level asset prices. 
To better understand our approach, consider the following example from our 
sample.3  ABC Inc. is a large, publicly traded firm, which in 1997 operated in all 50 
states, and in over 40 countries worldwide.  The firm had a number of insiders.  In 
particular, two of these insiders, Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnson (both board members), 
were actively trading over their times at ABC Inc., but in starkly different ways.  Mr. 
Smith had been trading in every April in the years prior to 1997, and in 1997 he again 
put on his usual April trade.  Mr. Johnson, in contrast, had been active over the same 
period, but had no patterns in his trading, trading some years in March, some years in 
August, some years in September, etc.  Further, they had quite different returns to their 
insider trading. 
Looking deeper into their trades, following Mr. Smith’s 1997 sale of ABC stock in 
April, the value of ABC Inc. actually rose in the following month by 3.2% (so a -3.2% 
return).  In contrast, following Mr. Johnson’s sale of ABC stock in December the stock 
plummeted after the subsequent revelation of two key pieces of news.  First, in the 
following month, when earnings were announced, ABC announced that customer 
defections remained a problem, and projected that the defections would continue in 
1998.  ABC’s price dropped over 5% on this news (even though ABC otherwise hit the 
consensus analysts’ earnings target), then dropped another 2% the following day, for a 
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2-day drop of over 7%.  In addition to this, 8 days following the earnings 
announcement, it was announced that ABC Inc. was being formally investigated by a 
large state government for mishandling of numerous dealings it had with the state.  In 
the 2 days following the release of this news, ABC Inc. dropped another 3.5%.  The 
total return of ABC Inc. following the month of Mr. Johnson’s stock sale was -12.6%.  
We illustrate the returns and events following Mr. Johnson’s trades in Appendix Figure 
A1.4   
 Had one taken the simple strategy of replicating Mr. Johnson’s trades (who we 
term as an “opportunistic insider” throughout the paper), one would have made over 
12% in the following month.  In contrast, had one replicated the trades of the other 
insider Mr. Smith (who we term as a “routine insider”, given his usual, routine trading 
pattern), one would have made -3.2% (since the price of ABC actually rose following his 
trades). 
In this paper we demonstrate that the above example of ABC Inc. represents a 
much more systematic pattern across the entire universe of corporate insiders and 
publicly traded firms.  We are able to systematically and predictably identify insiders as 
either opportunistic or routine traders throughout our sample period (1986-2007).  
Further, our classification scheme essentially divides the insider trading universe in half.  
We show that the abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero, 
indicating that our approach is able to weed out more than half the universe of insider 
trades, and specifically the half that has no predictive power for future returns or firm 
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news.  Meanwhile, the half that remains contains all of the predictive power in the 
insider trading universe. 
One other interesting aspect of Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnson are their 
backgrounds.  Both of these insiders were directors, sitting on the board of ABC Inc. in 
1997.  However, Mr. Johnson resided in the same city as ABC Inc., and so was a local 
insider, while Mr. Smith lived in a completely different state.  We show that this 
characteristic of being geographically ‘local’ is common to the most informed 
opportunistic traders. 
  Our empirical strategy for identifying routine traders is simple.  For each 
insider, we analyze her past trading history, and look for consistent patterns in the 
timing of trades.  Specifically, we define a routine trader as an insider who placed a 
trade in the same calendar month for at least a certain number of years in the past.  We 
then define opportunistic traders as everyone else, i.e. those insiders who have traded in 
the same years as the routine insiders, but for whom we cannot detect an obvious 
discernible pattern in the past timing of their trades.  We thus designate all insiders as 
either routine traders or opportunistic traders at the beginning of each calendar year, 
based on their past history of trades, and then look to see how they trade from that 
point onwards.  While this designation is made at the individual trader-level (i.e., 
classifying the insider as opportunistic or routine), we also use a trade-level classification 
(so that the same insider can have both routine and opportunistic trades), and obtain 
similar results and insights. 
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 We show that focusing only on the trades of opportunistic traders allows us to 
weed out uninformative signals and identify a set of information-rich trades that are 
powerful predictors of future firm returns, news, and events.  In addition, we provide 
insight into exactly what kind of information these opportunistic traders are trading on, 
who these informed opportunistic traders are, and which other market participants are 
following their trades.  Finally, we highlight the links between our opportunistic 
classification and SEC enforcement activities.   
To give an idea of the stark differential in information revealed by these 
opportunistic vs. routine insiders, a long-short portfolio that exploits solely the trades of 
opportunistic traders (opportunistic buys minus opportunistic sells) earns value-
weighted abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month (9.8 percent annualized, 
t=2.15), and equal-weighted abnormal returns of 180 basis points per month (21.6 
percent annualized, t=6.07).  Meanwhile, a portfolio that mimics the behavior of routine 
traders (routine buys minus routine sells) earns value-weighted returns of -20 basis 
points per month (t=-0.57), and equal-weighted returns of only 43 basis points per 
month (t=1.73).  We also demonstrate that an alternate approach for identifying 
routine trading–focusing on trade-level patterns within a given insider, and thus 
allowing a given insider to be both routine and opportunistic at different times–yields 
similar inferences regarding the predictive power of routine versus opportunistic trades.  
Finally, although our baseline classification procedure requires three years of past 
trading history in order to categorize a given insider, and hence restricts our main 
Decoding Inside Information — Page 8 
 
sample to a subset of the entire insider universe, we find that the “non-classified” trades 
that we exclude can be grouped into either the opportunistic or routine category 
without affecting our results; if anything, these non-classified trades appear to more 
closely resemble opportunistic trades rather than routine trades.  
   We show that over half of the improvement in predictive power gained by 
focusing on opportunistic trades comes from the superior performance of opportunistic 
sells relative to routine sells; this is in contrast to much of the literature (e.g., Jeng et 
al. (2003)), which generally finds weak evidence on the profitability of insider sales.  
Further, we find that the returns to these opportunistic trades continue to rise for 
roughly six months following the opportunistic trading month, and then level off, 
exhibiting no future reversal.  Thus, it appears that the information being conveyed 
through the trades of opportunistic insiders has lasting implications for firm values. 
 Importantly, we then examine the drivers of the large information differences 
revealed by opportunistic vs. routine traders.  Specifically, we begin by exploring exactly 
what firm-level information these opportunistic insiders appear to have the ability to 
predict.  We find that the trades of opportunistic insiders show significant predictive 
power for future news announcements about the firm, while trades by routine insiders 
do not.  Looking deeper into exactly what kind of news these opportunistic traders 
predict, we find that opportunistic insiders have statistically significant predictive power 
for announcement returns around: future analyst recommendations, future analyst 
earnings forecasts, future management forecasts, and future earnings announcements.  
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Again, routine traders show no predictive ability for these events. 
 We next examine the characteristics of these opportunistic traders.  We first find 
that the trades of local non-senior (i.e., not the CEO, CFO, or Chairman of the Board) 
opportunistic traders have the most predictability for future firm events.  We find that 
these informed local non-senior opportunistic traders share a number of characteristics.  
First, they tend to have a longer relationship with the firm than the average insider, 
and so perhaps more time to build a level of (or access to) information about the firm.  
Second, they are more likely to be from geographically concentrated firms (i.e., firms 
that have all of their operations in a single state).  These may be the exact firms where 
we might expect a local advantage to be most valuable.  Third, they are more likely to 
be from poorly governed firms, which is consistent with the idea that informative insider 
trading is more likely to take place where monitoring and institutional controls are 
weaker.  Lastly, they come from firms with more product offerings, suggesting that firms 
that produce lots of products, many of which may be hard to evaluate from the outside, 
tend to be places where the marginal benefit of inside information is largest. 
 We then show links between our opportunistic classification and enforcement 
actions taken by the SEC.  The motivation behind these tests is that one possible way 
to view our classification scheme is as a systematic way that enforcement officials could 
examine insider trading, rather than on a case-by-case basis.  Indeed, we show two 
interesting relationships between our classification and SEC enforcement activities.  
First, our classification scheme correctly identifies many of the high-profile insiders who 
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were later charged for illegal insider trading as opportunistic traders: e.g., Kenneth Lay 
(Founder and Chairman of Enron), Jeff Skilling (CEO of Enron), Joseph Nacchio (CEO 
of Qwest Communications), Victor Menezes (Senior Vice Chairman of Citigroup), and 
David Willey (CFO of Capital One).  In a more systematic way, we find that 
opportunistic trading significantly increases the likelihood of future SEC enforcement 
action, while routine trading does not.  Second, consistent with the idea that 
opportunistic traders dampen their trading activity when the potential costs of illegal 
insider trading increase, we find that the fraction of traders who are opportunistic in a 
given month is negatively related to the number of recent news releases by the SEC 
regarding illegal insider trading cases.  We also show suggestive evidence that 
institutional investors have some ability to decipher between the on average informed 
opportunistic trades and uninformed routine traders.  Institutional investors appear to 
mimic opportunistic trades in the quarter following these trades (but not routine insider 
trades).  They couple this with providing liquidity to the uninformed routine traders in 
the contemporaneous quarter (with no such contemporaneous relationship with 
opportunistic traders).   
Lastly, we perform a variety of robustness checks.  First, we show that the 
intensity of opportunistic trading (both trade-weighting and using number of trades) 
has significant predictive ability for future returns, while intensity of routine trading 
shows no such relation.  Also we verify that our results are not concentrated in certain 
types of stocks, or at certain specific times.  We show that our main result that 
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opportunistic trades are more informative than routine trades holds for both large stocks 
and small stocks, both heavily-traded stocks and lightly-traded stocks, both inside and 
outside explicit “blackout” periods, and across both the NYSE and NASDAQ stock 
exchanges.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I of the paper provides 
a brief background and literature review.  Section II describes our data on insider 
transactions, as well as the other data we use in the paper.  Section III provides the 
main results on the performance of opportunistic traders versus routine traders. Section 
IV explores which information events these opportunistic traders predict, as well as the 
link between institutional trading and opportunistic trading.  Section V investigates 
which types of opportunistic insiders are the most informed, and the characteristics of 
these insiders.  Section VI examines the response of opportunistic trading to SEC 
activity, as well as the predictors of SEC investigations.   Section VII concludes.  
  
I. The setting 
The trades of corporate insiders are among the most widely scrutinized activities 
in the stock market each day.  Regulators, investment managers, media members, and 
academics continually parse these trades for signs of illicit behavior, and for signals 
about a company’s future prospects.  Not surprisingly, the widespread interest in insider 
trading has spawned a large empirical literature, most of which examines the cross-
sectional return forecasting ability of insider trades aggregated at the firm level.  For 
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example, a large number of papers (see, for example Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Jaffe 
(1974), Seyhun (1986, 1998), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Lin and Howe (1990), Bettis, 
Vickery, and Vickery (1997), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), and Marin and Olivier (2008)) 
focus on the abnormal returns to firms in relation to various metrics of firm-level insider 
trading frequency over well-defined periods.  Seyhun (1998) summarizes this evidence 
and reports that several different trading rules lead to profits.5  Similarly, Jeng et al. 
(2003) take a performance-evaluation perspective and find that insider purchases earn 
abnormal returns of more than 6% per year, while insider sales do not earn significant 
abnormal returns.   
By contrast, our focus is on the individual insiders themselves and their past 
trading records, and as such our approach tries to isolate predictable variation in the 
informativeness of insider trades by identifying which insiders are likely to be trading on 
information and which are not.  While numerous papers study the cross-sectional 
variation of future stock returns as a function of past insider-trading activity, few 
papers share our micro-level focus on examining the characteristics and trading behavior 
of individual insiders in order to identify informed trading.  A notable exception is Scott 
and Xu (2004), who attempt to isolate information-driven insider trading and show that 
shares traded as a percentage of insiders’ holding contains predictive power for future 
returns.  Jenter (2005) also tries to filter out non-informative insider trades by 
controlling for recent changes in the value of managers’ equity stakes (in order to rule 
out diversification or rebalancing motives), but finds no predictive power of managers’ 
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insider trades for future returns. 
Since a key goal of our paper is also to understand what types of events our 
opportunistic (i.e., informed) traders predict, our findings are also related to a series of 
papers, many in the accounting literature, that examine insider trading around/before 
various types of firm events.  For example, with respect to future earnings news, 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) show that insider trades reflect both contrarian beliefs 
and superior information about future cash flow realizations, while Ke, Huddard and 
Petroni (2003) demonstrate that insiders trade before significant accounting disclosures 
as much as two years prior to the disclosure.6  In related work, Kahle (2000) finds that 
the long-run performance after seasoned equity offerings is significantly related to 
measures of insider trading, while Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle (2001) provide evidence 
consistent with insiders exploiting windows of opportunity by trying to issue overvalued 
equity.  Jagolinzer (2009) provides more evidence of strategic trading by insiders by 
focusing on a small sample of insiders who publicly disclose 10b5-1 plans (these plans 
came into existence in late 2000 and permit an insider to pre-specify her buys and sells 
on a given firm); he finds that insiders initiate sales plans before bad news and 
terminate sales plans before good performance.7  Note that our evidence in this paper 
pre-dates the existence of these plans: e.g., we find very similar differential performance 
of opportunistic versus routine trades before 2000, suggesting that our results are not 
driven by trades in these plans. 
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Lastly, since we analyze the link between opportunistic insider trading and 
institutional trading in this paper, our findings complement prior studies that have 
explored the connection between insider trades and institutional trades.  For example, 
Sias and Whidbee (2010) find a strong inverse relation between insider trading and 
institutional demand the same quarter and over the previous year, consistent with the 
idea that institutional investors are more likely to provide the liquidity necessary for 
insiders to trade, and that institutions and insiders are attracted to opposite security 
characteristics.  We present suggestive evidence that institutions follow the trades of 
past opportunistic insider trades (particularly opportunistic buys), and also provide 
liquidity to contemporaneous routine buys; in doing so we provide added insight into 
the relation documented in Sias and Whidbee (2010). 
 
II. Data 
 The data in this study are collected from several sources.  Our primary data on 
insider trades are drawn from the Thomson Reuters insider filings database.  Section 
16a of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires that open-market trades by 
corporate insiders be reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within 
10 days after the end of month in which they took place.  This 10-day deadline was 
later changed to a 2-day deadline in 2002.  The median delay between trade date and 
report date over our entire 22 year sample is 3 days.   
 Corporate insiders include officers with decision-making authority over the 
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operations of the firm, all board members, and beneficial owners of more than 10% of a 
company’s stock.  These reports, filed on the SEC’s Form 4, contain information about 
each insider transaction and about each insider’s relationship to the firm.8 Our data are 
drawn from these Form 4 filings for the period January, 1986 to December, 2007.  Our 
analysis focuses on open-market purchases and sales by insiders, and hence we exclude 
options exercises and private transactions.  We merge our insider transaction data with 
firm-level data from CRSP/Compustat, including monthly stock returns, market 
capitalization figures, and book-to-market ratios.     
 For our tests involving insider trades before news announcements, we extract 
headline news data from various newswires using the Factiva web interface. First, we 
use the CRSP monthly stock name file to identify all company names of CRSP firms 
between 1989 and 2007. We then select all the Dow Jones Newswires, as well as other 
newswires, that are available on Factiva.  For each stock on the CRSP tape we extract 
all the news events where the firm’s name (or any of the names if multiple names exist 
for a given stock) is mentioned in either the headline or in the lead paragraph. We 
restrict the search to news items in English containing at least 5 words. We exclude 
republished news and recurring pricing or market data. For every news item we retain 
the headline, the release date, the release time, the word count and the data source. The 
final sample includes 2,956,862 headlines for 12,455 stocks between the years 1989 to 
2000.  The reason we include news data only up to 2000 is that Factiva had a structural 
break in their indexing system in that year, and hence from 2000 onwards indexed many 
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fewer firms in the news articles in its data.   
 Table I presents summary statistics for our sample.  This table presents an 
overview of the Thomson Reuters insiders database, as well as the subset of the data for 
which we can define the “routine” and “opportunistic” traders that feature in our 
analysis.  As noted earlier, routine trades are made for a variety of reasons.  For 
example, routine sells by insiders are often driven by diversification or liquidity reasons, 
with the insider wanting to signal that he is not trading on information about the firm 
(e.g., Bill Gates).  Routine buys, on the other hand, may occur after an insider receives 
a bonus; since bonuses are generally paid out in the same month each year, and since 
insiders often receive discount plans on their company stock (and hence are more likely 
to buy the stock), insider buying in the same calendar month is common and often 
uninformative. 
 We require an insider to make at least one trade in each of the three preceding 
years in order to define her as either an opportunistic or a routine trader.  Specifically, 
we then define a routine trader as an insider who placed a trade in the same calendar 
month for at least three consecutive years.9  We define opportunistic traders as everyone 
else, i.e. those insiders for whom we cannot detect an obvious discernible pattern in the 
past timing of their trades.  We thus designate all insiders as either routine traders or 
opportunistic traders at the beginning of each calendar year, based on their past history 
of trades, and then look to see how they trade from that point onwards.  All subsequent 
trades that are made after we classify each insider as either routine or opportunistic are 
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then placed into one of two buckets: a) “routine trades” (i.e., all trades made by routine 
traders), and b) “opportunistic trades” (i.e., all trades made by opportunistic traders).  
In Exhibit A1 in the Appendix we provide a series of hypothetical traders by an insider, 
in order to further illustrate the timing and specifics of our approach.   
 Note that this simple algorithm for identifying routine buying or selling by 
insiders is clearly a noisy proxy for actual routine trading; our strategy will not perfectly 
and correctly classify each and every insider trade.  But the essence of our approach is 
that on average, trades made for information reasons are less likely to be regular in their 
timing, and trades made for liquidity and diversification reasons are more likely to be 
regular in their timing.   We have experimented with a variety of alternate measures 
(which yield similar results),10 but these simple measures are sufficient to illustrate our 
main point.  Importantly, as noted above, if we alter our classification scheme in order 
to exploit trade-level patterns within a given insider--and thus allow a given insider to 
be both routine and opportunistic at different times--we again find similar results on the 
relative predictive power of routine versus opportunistic trades; these results are 
described in Section III. 
 As an independent verification for our classification scheme of opportunistic vs. 
routine traders, we examine the trading of the two different types of traders around 
likely stock grant dates.  If we are truly capturing routine trading, it would be good to 
see this trading being higher around likely stock grant dates.  We use fiscal year end 
dates of firms as this has been shown to be a quite common date for grants (Norton and 
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Porter (2010)).  We find many more routine trades in the quarter following a fiscal 
year-end compared to opportunistic trades.  Specifically, we find that 58% of buys (75% 
of sells) are routine in the quarter after the fiscal year end, but that only 38% of buys 
(52% of sells) are routine in other quarters.  This finding fits with our simple 
classification identifying routine trades, as they are significantly more likely to occur 
during times when regular, non-informative, liquidity-inducing events (such as stock 
grants) take place. 
 Table I indicates that by implementing our routine trade identification 
assumptions (e.g., requiring three years of past insider transactions), our final sample 
(Partitionable Sample) is about one-third the size of the entire sample of insider 
transactions.11  Panel A shows that our sample is tilted towards bigger stocks, and 
slightly towards growth stocks (i.e., lower book-to-market ratios).  We can also see this 
in Figure A2 in the Appendix, which shows that our insider sample has fewer micro-cap 
stocks (smallest decile) and roughly twice the percentage of largest decile stocks as 
compared to the CRSP universe.  Panel B of Table I shows that the insiders we include 
in our sample have a somewhat higher average number of trades (4.8 buys to 2.4, and 
8.2 sells to 4.1) relative to all insiders.12  All of these differences are statistically 
significant. 
 
[Insert Table I here] 
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 However, we have verified that our sample is representative of the larger universe 
of all insider trades in terms of the percentage of insider buys and sells (24% buys in the 
entire sample, 25% in our sample) and in terms of the overall return predictability of 
insider buys and insider sells.  For example, the difference in profitability of a value-
weighted long-short portfolio that goes long insider buys and short insider sells, in our 
sample versus the overall sample, is only 21 basis points per month and is statistically 
insignificant (t=0.83).  Table A2 in the Appendix presents further evidence on the 
profitability of insider trades, by splitting the insider universe into young versus old 
companies (where the cutoff for young companies is 3 years since the IPO).  Table A2 
shows that there is no statistical difference in the profitability of insider trades in young 
versus old companies; thus we are not imposing any bias in our sample by focusing more 
often on insider trades made in large companies (that tend to be older).  We also show 
(in Table A3 in the Appendix) that there is no statistical difference in the profitability 
of "young" versus "old" insiders (where youth is measured by years of trading history 
for a given insider--"old" insiders are those with more than 3 years of trading history).   
 We have also directly examined the set of “non-classified” trades, i.e. those 
trades that do not make it into universe, to check if these trades are systematically 
different from the trades in our universe.  Non-classified trades consist of those insider 
trades that we cannot classify into either routine or opportunistic trades, since they 
were made by insiders without three consecutive years of past trading history.  When 
we look at the properties of the entire non-classified universe, we see that these trades 
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look similar to the trades in our universe.  For example, in Appendix Table A4 we show 
that the returns on a naïve insider mimicking portfolio (buys-sells) in our universe 
compared to the returns on this same naïve insider mimicking portfolio in the currently 
non-classified universe are not statistically or economically different from one another.  
Further, Appendix Table A5 shows that if we run our baseline tests from Table II, but 
include all non-classified trades in either the opportunistic or routine category, 
opportunistic trades are still large and significant predictors of future returns, while 
routine trades are not.  If anything, this table indicates that non-classified trades appear 
to more closely resemble opportunistic trades than routine trades, since the 
predictability of routine trades slightly improves once the non-classified trades are 
included in the routine category.    
 As Table I shows, in our sample we classify roughly 64% of insider purchases and 
52% of insider sales as routine trades; hence 36% of insider purchases and 48% of insider 
sales are classified as opportunistic trades.  Overall, trades made by routine traders 
comprise 55% of the total sample, while trades made by opportunistic traders represent 
45% of the total sample. 
In Appendix Table A6 we present the full set of correlation coefficients for the 
main variables that feature in our analysis.  To summarize, we find that the number of 
opportunistic buys, number of opportunistic sells, number of routine buys, and number 
of routine sells are all essentially uncorrelated with each other.  Additionally, the 
number of insider sells, and particularly routine sells, is higher for larger firms and 
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growth firms, while the number of insider buys, and particularly opportunistic buys, is 
higher for smaller firms and value firms.  Consistent with the past literature, insiders 
are contrarian, buying after low past returns (measured over the prior 12 months) and 
selling after high past returns. 
     
III. Performance of Opportunistic Versus Routine Insiders 
In this section we examine the future stock return predictability of corporate 
insiders.  The goal of our approach is to identify, out of the hundreds of thousands of 
insider trades made each year, which trades are truly informative.  To do so we 
implement our routine vs. opportunistic trader classification, and then analyze the stock 
return performance of routine versus opportunistic insiders.   
 
A. Baseline Regression Results 
Our first tests employ regressions of one-month-ahead stock returns on indicators 
for routine and opportunistic trades.  We run pooled regressions with standard errors 
clustered at the firm level; we also include month fixed effects where indicated.  In 
addition, we include controls for well-known determinants of stock returns, such as size 
(log of market capitalization), (log) book-to-market ratio, one-month lagged returns, 
and cumulative past returns from month t-12 to t-2.   
Table II presents these regression results.  Columns 2 and 4 illustrate the main 
result of the paper: both opportunistic buys and opportunistic sells are strong predictors 
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of future returns, while routine buys and sells are not.  For example, the coefficient on 
opportunistic buys in column 2 indicates that opportunistic buys yield an incremental 
90 basis points (t=4.64) in the following month relative to all insider trades.  
Meanwhile, routine buys yield only 14 additional basis points (t=0.81).  The difference 
in the coefficients on opportunistic buys and routine buys (=76 basis points) is 
statistically significant (F-test=10.07, p-value=0.002).13  The results for sells are similar: 
Column 4 shows that opportunistic sells earn an additional -78 basis points (t=5.67), 
while routine sells earn +4 additional basis points (t=0.24).  Again, this difference 
between opportunistic sells and routine sells is large (=-82 basis points) and statistically 
significant (F-test=29.30, p-value=0.000).    
Columns 5 and 6 of Table II present similar results, but with all four dummy 
variables (Opportunistic Buy, Routine Buy, Opportunistic Sell, Routine Sell) included 
in the same regression.  Consistent with the results in Columns 1-6, these tests indicate 
that opportunistic trades are informative for future returns, while routine trades are not.  
In Column 6, the difference in coefficients between opportunistic buys and routine buys 
is 77 basis points (F-tests=10.32, p-value=0.001), and the difference in coefficients 
between opportunistic sells and routine sells is 81 basis points (F-test=28.87, p-
value=0.000). 
   
[Insert Table II here] 
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Overall, the combined differences in the coefficients between opportunistic trades 
and routine trades in Table II translate into an increase of 158 basis points per month 
in the predictive ability of opportunistic trades relative to routine trades.14  
Additionally, our results demonstrate that over half the improvement in predictive 
power gained by focusing on opportunistic trades comes from the superior performance 
of opportunistic sells relative to routine sells; as noted earlier, this is in contrast to much 
of the literature (e.g., Jeng et al. (2003)), which often struggles to find evidence that 
insider sales predict lower future returns.    
 
B. Trade-Level Results 
 Next we investigate an alternate, trade-level measure of "routine" and 
"opportunistic," as opposed to the trader-level measure used so far.  This measure 
allows a given trader to have both routine and opportunistic trades; e.g., a given trader 
may be dubbed routine after having three straight January trades, but in this alternate 
setup we only dub his subsequent January trades as routine trades, and categorize his 
trades in all other months as opportunistic.  And also, an opportunistic trader can have 
routine trades if he establishes a routine in any given calendar month.   
We present these trade-level results in Table III.  Column 2 shows that the spread 
between opportunistic and routine buys using this trade-level measure (analog of 
Column 2 in Table II) is again large and significant (=94 basis points, F-test=8.39, p-
value=0.0038), while Column 4 indicates that the spread between opportunistic and 
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routine sells (analog of Column 4 in Table II) is also again large and significant (=94 
basis points, F-test=15.99, p-value=0.0001).  These results demonstrate that our 
opportunistic vs. routine identification of informed insider trading is robust to 
reasonable changes in the classification procedure.     
 
[Insert Table III here] 
 
C. Portfolio Returns  
 In this section we analyze the returns of portfolios formed according to our 
routine trade classification scheme.  These provide a further test of the predictive ability 
of opportunistic versus routine trades.  To construct our portfolios, we identify 
opportunistic and routine trades each month, and then form opportunistic buy, 
opportunistic sell, routine buy, and routine sell portfolios containing these stocks.  We 
then hold these stocks over the month following these insider trades; at the end of the 
month, we rebalance the portfolios based on new insider trades. 
Although the official SEC regulation was a requirement to report by the tenth 
day of the following month (which was then changed to 2 days after the trade date in 
2002), nearly all of the trades in our sample were reported to the SEC within a few days 
of the trade (median of 3 days over the entire sample), so we are confident they were 
available at portfolio formation here.  Given that the actual required reporting date for 
insiders was the 10th of the following month until 2002, in the Appendix Table A7 we 
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re-run all the results from Table II, but this time using returns from the 11th day of 
month t+1 to the 10th day of month t+2 in our tests (rather than from the 1st day of 
month t+1 to the last day of month t+1), and the results are virtually identical to 
those in Table II, meaning that our results are not sensitive to the timing convention we 
employ here; this finding also demonstrates that our results are fully tradable in real-
time.   
 Table IV reports raw portfolio returns, as well as risk-adjusted portfolio returns 
(alphas) for the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model, and the five-factor model including a liquidity factor, as well as DGTW 
characteristic-adjusted returns.15  This table also reports both equal- and value-weighted 
portfolios.  Table IV shows that a portfolio strategy that focuses solely on the trades 
made by opportunistic traders earns large and significant returns, while a strategy that 
follows the trades of routine traders does not.  For example, the equal-weighted portfolio 
that goes long opportunistic buys and short opportunistic sells earns a five-factor alpha 
of 180 basis points per month (t=6.07), or over 21.6% per year, while the portfolio that 
goes long routine buys and short routine sells earns a only marginally significant 43 
basis points per month (t=1.73). 
 
[Insert Table IV here] 
   
 The bottom half of Table IV reveals a similar pattern for value-weighted returns.  
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While the spread between routine buys and routine sells is actually negative when using 
value-weighted returns, the spread in five-factor alphas between opportunistic buys and 
opportunistic sells is a positive and significant 82 basis points per month (t=2.15), or 
9.8% per year.  Thus our predictability evidence is not limited to smaller firms, as in 
some prior studies that use insider trading data (see Lakonishok and Lee (2001)).16  
Further, these results again demonstrate that all of the return predictability in the 
insider universe is concentrated within the trades of opportunistic traders.   
 In Figure 1 we plot event-time returns based on the portfolios out to twelve 
months, to illustrate the longer-term performance of opportunistic trades relative to 
routine trades.  Figure 1 indicates that the twelve-month event-time return on a value-
weighted four-leg spread portfolio (=[Opportunistic Buy-Opportunistic Sells]-[Routine 
Buys-Routine Sells]) is roughly 4%; for the equal-weighted four-leg spread portfolio, the 
twelve-month event-time return is roughly 8%.  In both cases, returns continue to rise 
for the first six months, and then level off, exhibiting no future reversal.  The fact that 
we see no reversal following the price rise suggests that the information being conveyed 
through the trades of opportunistic insiders is important for fundamental firm value. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
      
 Taken as a whole, the findings in Table IV and Figure 1 corroborate our earlier 
regression results, and provide economically and statistically significant evidence that 
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insider trades by opportunistic traders are much more informative than insider trades 
by routine traders.   
 
D. Robustness  
In this section we perform a series of additional tests in order to evaluate the 
robustness of our findings. First we investigate the impact that the number of a given 
type of trade (i.e., the strength of the signal) may convey in terms of incremental 
information above and beyond the mere knowledge that a particular type of trade took 
place.  These results are reported in Appendix Table A9.  We find that the number of 
opportunistic buys (sells) is a strong predictor of future positive (negative) returns.  To 
get an idea of the magnitude of this effect, a one-standard deviation increase in the log 
number of opportunistic buys per month translates to higher future returns of 35 basis 
points per month (t=4.56).17  In contrast, the number of routine buys and the number 
of routine sells have no relation to future returns.   
We also verify that our results are not concentrated on a particular exchange, in 
certain types of stocks, or at certain specific times.  To do so, we examine a variety of 
subsamples, such as NYSE stocks versus Nasdaq stocks, large stocks versus small stocks, 
stocks heavily-traded by insiders versus stocks lightly-traded by insiders, and finally 
trades made only during specific times (such as inside or outside explicit “blackout” 
windows).   
Appendix Table A10 presents our results broken down by exchange listing, and 
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shows that opportunistic buys and sells are strong predictors of future returns for both 
NYSE and Nasdaq stocks, while routine buys and sells are uninformative across both 
exchanges.  In Appendix Table A11, we find that opportunistic trades (both buys and 
sells) predict returns for both large stocks and small stocks, while routine trades (both 
buys and sells) are uninformative for both large and small stocks.  To check if insider 
trading intensity (see Seyhun (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001)) is related to our 
findings, we split our sample by the fraction of shares outstanding traded by insiders in 
the prior year for a given stock, and again find that both opportunistic buys and sells 
are strongly predictive of future returns for both high- and low-intensity stocks.  
We also explore if our results are concentrated inside (or outside) explicit 
“blackout” windows, which are times during which insiders are allegedly prohibited from 
trading in their company’s stock.  Although these windows vary by firm (see Bettis, 
Coles, and Lemmon (2000)), many firms explicitly allow insider trading solely during 
the month following a quarterly earnings announcement (e.g., trading days +3 to +24 
after an earnings release).  Focusing on the post-earnings (+3 to +24) trading window, 
and also excluding any trades that occur up to 30 days before an M&A announcement, 
in order to define our “non-blackout” period,18 we find that during both blackout and 
non-blackout periods, opportunistic buys (and sells) are strong predictors of future 
returns.  In contrast, routine trades (buys and sells) have no predictive power for future 
returns during either blackout or non-blackout periods.  Thus our robustness checks 
indicate that opportunistic trades are much more informative than routine trades for a 
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variety of subsamples: NYSE stocks, Nasdaq stocks, large stocks, small stocks, heavily-
traded stocks, lightly-traded stocks, and inside and outside pre-defined blackout 
windows.   
Taken as a whole, our results indicate that opportunistic trades, and the intensity 
of these trades, are a robust predictor of future returns, while routine trades are not.  
These findings suggest that the ability to predictably classify insiders into either routine 
or opportunistic traders, using our simple empirical strategy, allows one to focus in on 
the half of the insider universe that contains all the informative trades. 
  
IV. What Insiders Predict and Who Mimics Their Trades 
In this section we explore the mechanism behind the large return predictability 
that we observe following opportunistic insider trades, and also explore the link between 
institutional trading and opportunistic insider trading. 
  
A. Predicting Firm-Level Information Events  
We start by examining whether opportunistic traders are more likely than routine 
traders to trade preceding important information events for the firm.  To do so, we run 
panel regressions of firm-level information events (available from 1989-2000) on the 
number of opportunistic trades and the number of routine trades.  The information 
events we examine are: headline news events about the firm, sell-side analyst research 
releases about the firm (i.e., annual and quarterly earnings forecast revisions, as well as 
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buy/sell recommendation changes), and important management disclosures about the 
firm (SEO announcements and merger announcements).19  We use the number of firm-
level information events in a given category in a given month as our left-hand side 
variable, and control for the general level of news about the firm on the right-hand side 
(using, for example, the number of information events last month, and the average 
number of information events over the prior six months).  As in Tables II and III, we 
also control for firm-level measures of size, book-to-market, and past returns. 
Table V shows that opportunistic trades are predictive of future information events 
at the insider’s firm, while routine trades are not.  This result holds across all 
information events, holds for a variety of sub-categories, and holds whether or not we 
control for the general level of news about a firm.  For example, in Column 2 of Table 
V, where we use the sum of all information events as the left-hand side variable, the 
coefficient on the number of opportunistic trades is positive (=0.03) and significant 
(t=2.78), while this same coefficient for routine trades is insignificant.  To get an idea of 
the magnitude of this effect, a one-standard deviation increase in the number of 
opportunistic trades translates into 1.0 more total information events in the following 
month for the firm; the average number of total information events per firm per month 
is 4.8 (median=5), so this effect implies a percentage increase of around 20% in the 
number of important events following these opportunistic trades. 
 
[Insert Table V here] 
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Looking specifically at firm news, Columns 3 and 4 show that opportunistic insider 
trades are strongly predictive of future headline news events.  The coefficient on 
opportunistic trades in Column 4 (=0.03, t=3.26) implies that for a one-standard 
deviation move in the number of opportunistic trades, the firm experiences 1.0 more 
headline news events next month relative to an average of 3.3 events per month 
(median=3); in percentage terms this translates to a 32% to 35% increase in the number 
of headline news events.  Finally, in the Appendix Table A12 we show that if we split 
the number of opportunistic insider trades into the number of opportunistic buys and 
sells separately, both variables predict future news.  In fact, Column 6 of Table A12 
indicates that opportunistic sells have somewhat more predictive power for future news 
than opportunistic buys, although both are significant predictors of future news.  This 
provides additional evidence on the power of our classification scheme to identify 
informative insider sells in particular, in contrast to much of the literature. 
 
B. Predicting Announcement Returns for Specific Types of News Releases  
In this section we explore in greater detail the specific types of news events that 
follow opportunistic trading.  Exploring this issue in greater depth gives more insight 
into the source of insider profitability.  To do so, we examine the predictability of 
opportunistic buys and sells for announcement returns for a series of news categories.     
In general, we find that opportunistic trades seem to predict shorter-term news 
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events, as opposed to long-term firm-level measures like annual employment or 
inventory changes.  For example, Table VI reports the results of regressions of 
announcement returns (from t-1: t+1), for various types of events, on opportunistic and 
routine insider trades.  Focusing first on headline news events as the dependent variable 
(in Column 1), we see that opportunistic buys in the prior month predict higher news 
announcement returns (coefficient=0.29, t=2.59), and opportunistic sells in the prior 
month predict lower news announcement returns (coefficient=-0.22, t=4.11).  At the 
same time, routine buys and routine sells have no predictive power for news 
announcement returns (and the signs are actually in the opposite direction from the 
opportunistic trade coefficients). 
 
[Insert Table VI here] 
 
Next we explore specific kinds of news releases, and find that opportunistic trades 
(primarily opportunistic buys) predict analyst information releases (recommendations + 
earnings forecasts), analyst earnings forecasts by themselves, management forecasts, and 
firm-level earnings announcements.  Specifically, Columns 2-5 of Table VI show that 
opportunistic buys in the prior month have statistically significant predictive power for 
announcement returns around analyst information events (coefficient=0.13, t=1.78), 
earnings forecasts (coefficient=0.17, t=2.17), management forecasts (coefficient=1.05, 
t=2.46), and future earnings announcement returns (coefficient=0.30, t=1.96).  For all 
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of these regressions, opportunistic sells do not have statistically significant predictive 
power for future announcement returns, although the signs are all negative. Meanwhile, 
routine trades are never significant predictors of future announcement returns across all 
event categories, except in the case of routine sells predicting positive earnings 
announcement returns.   
In untabulated tests we also examine mergers and issuance in this same framework, 
but find that neither routine trades nor opportunistic trades have predictive power for 
merger/issuance announcement returns in the following month.  And lastly, in addition 
to these relatively high-frequency announcement return tests, we also examine some 
annual variables such as employment and inventory changes (drawn from Compustat), 
finding little evidence that insider trading (by either opportunistic or routine insiders) 
predicts these lower-frequency, annual variables. 
 
C. The Link Between Institutional Trading and Opportunistic Trading 
Our results on the predictive ability of opportunistic insiders’ trades raise the 
question of whether or not other investors or agents in the financial markets are aware 
of this type of informed trading.  In this section of the paper we explore the connection 
between institutional trading and opportunistic insider trading, and later in the paper 
we explore the link between SEC activity and opportunistic insider trading. 
To investigate a potential link between institutional trading and opportunistic 
insider trading, we regress the change in institutional ownership of a stock on the (log of 
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the) number of opportunistic and routine trades in that stock.  We measure the change 
in institutional ownership at a quarterly frequency, and aggregate up the number of 
opportunistic/routine trades each quarter as well.  We explore both a lagged response 
(i.e., the impact of opportunistic/routine trades over the past 2 quarters on the change 
in institutional holdings this quarter), and a contemporaneous response (i.e., the impact 
of opportunistic/routine trades this quarter on the change in institutional holdings this 
quarter).   
This approach enables us to tackle two questions.  The lagged response allows us 
to answer the following question: do institutions follow the trades of opportunistic 
insiders in their subsequent trades?  And the contemporaneous response allows us to 
answer a slightly different question: do institutions provide differential liquidity for some 
types of insider trades relative to others (i.e., are institutions smart enough to provide 
liquidity only in the case of routine trades).  Our tests are similar in spirit to those 
performed in Sias and Whidbee (2010), who report a strong inverse relation between 
insider trading and institutional demand in the same quarter and over the previous 
year.   
The last three columns of Table VI present the results of these tests.  We find 
some suggestive evidence on both of the questions posed above.  First, we find that 
institutions do appear to react more strongly to past opportunistic trades than to past 
routine trades.  Past opportunistic buys (sells) predict future increases (decreases) in 
institutional holdings, meaning that institutions trade in the same direction as past 
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opportunistic insiders.  Further, Column 8 of Table VI shows that the predictive power 
of opportunistic buys for future holdings is statistically significant even after including 
controls for size, book-to-market, and previous year returns, as well as date fixed effects 
(coefficient=0.167, t=2.13).  The predictive power of opportunistic sells for future 
holdings is statistically significant without fixed effects and controls, marginally 
significant with fixed effects, but not significant with fixed effects and controls 
(although the sign is still negative).  Meanwhile, routine buys predict future increases in 
institutional holdings, but this result is smaller in magnitude than the predictive power 
of opportunistic buys, and is not statistically significant with fixed effects and controls 
included.  Column 8 also shows that routine sells predict changes in holdings with the 
opposite sign (the coefficient is positive); plus the result is not statistically significant.  
Taken together, these findings provide suggestive evidence that institutions follow 
opportunistic insiders’ trades (particularly the opportunistic buys) more so than routine 
insiders’ trades.  Thus institutions do appear to have at least some understanding of the 
differential informativeness of opportunistic versus routine insider trades that we 
document in this paper. 
Second, in looking at the contemporaneous responses (i.e., the impact of 
opportunistic/routine trades this quarter on the change in institutional holdings this 
quarter), we find some modest evidence that institutions appear to provide liquidity for 
routine buys, but not for (or at least less for) opportunistic buys.  Specifically, in 
Columns 6-8 of Table VI the coefficient on contemporaneous routine buys is negative 
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and significant, but the coefficient on contemporaneous opportunistic buys is 
insignificant and only slightly negative.  Meanwhile the coefficients on both 
opportunistic sells and routine sells are both insignificant.   
Collectively, these tests highlight a potential link between institutional trading and 
insider trading.  While our evidence is only suggestive, our results are consistent with 
the idea that institutions follow the trades of past opportunistic insider trades 
(particularly opportunistic buys), and also provide liquidity to contemporaneous routine 
buys.      
 
V. Which Insiders Are Informed? 
Next we explore our basic results in even greater depth by analyzing which types 
of opportunistic insiders are especially informed about future news events.   
 
A. Who Predicts News? 
To isolate the types of insiders who are most informed, we run predictive 
regressions of news on various categories of insiders.  Specifically, in Table VII we add a 
series of additional explanatory variables to the specifications from Columns 1-3 of 
Table V, where we use the total number of information events as our dependent 
variable.  In addition to the number of opportunistic trades, we add independent 
variables equal to: a) the number of opportunistic trades by local insiders (where local is 
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defined as residing in the same state as the firm’s corporate headquarters), b) the 
number of opportunistic trades by senior insiders (where senior is defined as either the 
CEO, CFO, or Chairman of the Board), c) the number of opportunistic trades by 
inside/non-independent directors,20 and d) the number of opportunistic trades by 
outside/independent directors (where independent directors are identified using the 
“role-code” variable in the Thomson database).21 
The first column of Table VII indicates that the number of opportunistic trades by 
local insiders is positively related to the total number of firm-level information events in 
the following month.  The magnitude of the coefficient in Column 1 (=0.03, t=2.85) 
implies that for a one-standard deviation move in the number of opportunistic trades by 
locals, the firm experiences 1.0 additional information events next month (so a roughly 
20% increase, with an average of 4.8 and median of 5).  By contrast, comparing these to 
the opportunistic trades of the other classes of insiders in Columns 2-4, and especially in 
the full specification of Column 5, we find no significant difference in the explanatory 
power between the opportunistic trades of independent directors, senior insiders, or 
inside directors.  Given the evidence in Ravina and Sapienza (2009) that the difference 
in the profitability of insider trades by executives relative to those by independent 
directors is quite small, these results may not be surprising.  Geographic localness of the 
opportunistic insider, in contrast, remains a strong, significant predictor.   
 
[Insert Table VII here] 
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B. The Characteristics of Informed Insiders 
An intriguing finding from Table VII is that it is specifically the local insiders who 
are not senior management whose opportunistic trades predict future information 
events.  In this section we explore this finding in greater depth to try to better 
understand the characteristics of these insiders.  To do so, we run a logit regression that 
tries to pinpoint the characteristics of these local non-senior insiders, where the 
dependent variable equals 1 if the insider in question is a local non-senior opportunistic 
trader, and where the independent variables are a series of insider- and firm-level 
characteristics.  We explore the following independent variables: a) the tenure of the 
insider at the given firm, b) firm-level geographic concentration, c) firm-level 
governance, and d) firm-level products.  Insider experience is measured as the (log of 
the) number of years active as an insider for the given firm.  To measure firm-level 
geographic concentration, we employ three measures using on the dispersion of each 
firm’s operations across states.  Specifically, we use data from Garcia and Norli (2010) 
on the state-level operations of public firms.22  This data is much more detailed than the 
Compustat Geographic Segment Data, which only provides coarse segment data on 
whether or not the firm was completely domestic versus having some segments located 
internationally.  We construct three measures:  i) the percentage of sales in a firm’s 
home (local) state,  ii) a geographic Herfindahl index using sales and drawn from this 
same data, and iii) the (log of the) number of states that the firm has operations in.  
Decoding Inside Information — Page 39 
 
We measure firm-level governance using the value of the G-Index from Gompers, Ishii, 
Metrick (2003).  Finally, we compute firm-level products using data from the 
Compustat segment file, and use the number of products for a given firm in a given year 
in our regression tests.  Note that each insider, and so each independent variable, is 
defined when the insider is labeled as routine or opportunistic (after the insider trades 
three years in a row for the first time, in December of the third year with trades).       
Table VIII presents the results from these tests.  Table VIII indicates that local 
non-senior opportunistic insiders are more likely to be: a) those with longer tenure at 
the firm, b) those from more geographically concentrated firms, c) those from poorly 
governed firms, and d) those from firms that make more products.  Specifically, Column 
1 shows that the coefficient on log(number of years active) is positive and significant in 
predicting the likelihood of becoming a local non-senior opportunistic trader.  We 
control for the number of trades in this regression, as we want to isolate the effect of 
time in the firm, conditional on trading activity of the individual insider (so for two 
insiders that have traded the same amount, is the one who has had longer to build the 
firm relationship more likely to be the informed opportunistic insider).  Level of trading 
itself is a negative and significant predictor of being a local non-senior insider who 
trades opportunistically. This is consistent with routine insiders simply trading every 
routine period irrespective of information, while these informed local non-senior 
opportunistic traders trade only when they have valuable information (perhaps not 
surprisingly, less frequently).23  
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[Insert Table VIII here] 
 
Columns 2-4 show that for all three measures of geographic concentration, the 
more geographically concentrated a firm is, the more likely the insider is to be a local 
non-senior who trades opportunistically.  Specifically, Columns 2, 3, and 4 show 
respectively that: the fewer states a firm operates in, the more geographically 
concentrated firm operations are, and the larger the percentage of operations in the 
home (local to the insider) state, the more likely the insider is to be one of these 
informed local insiders.  Next, Columns 5 and 6 show that coming from a poorly 
governed firm (measured using the value of the G-Index from Gompers, Ishii, Metrick 
(2003), where larger numbers signify worse governance, and also using a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm has a G-Index>12–which is the 90th percentile in our 
sample) is a positive and significant predictor of become a local non-senior opportunistic 
trader in our sample.  Finally, Column 7 indicates that a measure of firm-level products 
is a positive predictor of the likelihood of becoming a local non-senior insider.     
Taken as a whole, our results on the characteristics of these local, non-senior 
opportunistic insiders are interesting, and intuitive.  For example, the idea that one’s 
tenure at a company would be correlated with one’s level of information about that 
company is sensible, as is the fact that local non-senior opportunistic traders would be 
more likely to come from geographically concentrated firms.  The product result is 
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novel, and suggests that firms that produce lots of products, many of which may be 
hard to evaluate from the outside, tend to be places where the marginal benefit of inside 
information is largest.  And finally, the governance result is consistent with the idea 
that informative insider trading is more likely to take place where monitoring and 
institutional controls are weaker. 
 
V. SEC Activity and Opportunistic Insider Trading 
As noted earlier, our results on the predictive ability of opportunistic insiders’ 
trades raise the question of whether or not other agents in the financial markets are 
aware of this type of informed trading, particularly the key enforcement agency 
responsible for prosecuting illegal insider trading: the SEC.  While we cannot say 
definitively that our tests pinpoint illegal insider trading, we do note that: a) several 
high-profile insiders who were later charged by the SEC (e.g., Kenneth Lay (Founder 
and Chairman of Enron), Jeff Skilling (CEO of Enron), Joseph Nacchio (CEO of Qwest 
Communications), Victor Menezes (Senior Vice Chairman of Citigroup), and David 
Willey (CFO of Capital One)) are classified as opportunistic insiders according to our 
classification scheme, and b) our earlier results that opportunistic trades predict future 
news, returns at the time of the news, and earnings announcement returns, suggest that 
some of these insiders may be trading on material, non-public information.  In this 
section, we explore the link between SEC activity and opportunistic insider trading 
more formally.  
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A. The Response of Opportunistic Insiders to SEC Activity  
First we explore the behavior of opportunistic traders in the wake of news about 
illegal insider trading litigation cases.  Since opportunistic trades predict future firm-
level returns, as well as future firm-level news, it is plausible that opportunistic traders 
might be especially sensitive to the potential costs and penalties associated with illegal 
insider trading.  We test this idea by regressing the fraction of insiders trading in a 
given month who are opportunistic on recent SEC releases regarding litigation cases 
against illegal insider trading. Specifically, the dependent variable we examine is the 
number of opportunistic insiders trading in month t+1 divided by the number of all 
insiders trading in month t+1, and the independent variable of interest is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of SEC releases regarding litigation cases against 
illegal insider activity in month t.  We include control variables for the fraction of 
opportunistic insiders trading in month t and month t-1, the CRSP value-weighted 
market return in month t, the standard deviation of daily market returns in month t, 
and various windows of past cumulative market returns (month t-3 to t-1, month t-6 to 
t-1, and month t-12 to t-1). 
Panel A of Table IX illustrates that opportunistic trading decreases significantly 
following recent releases from the SEC regarding illegal insider trading cases, consistent 
with the idea that opportunistic traders dampen their trading activity when the 
potential costs of illegal trading increase.  Specifically, the coefficient on the number of 
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SEC releases in Column 7 is -0.015 (t=2.41).24 
 
[Insert Table IX here] 
 
B. What Predicts SEC Investigations?   
Next we analyze the determinants of being investigated by the SEC in a regression 
framework in Panel B of Table IX.  Specifically, Panel B reports logit regressions, where 
the dependent variable is equal to one if the insider has been named in an SEC press 
release related to insider trading.  The observations are at the insider level, and insider 
characteristics are recorded based on all trades of each insider.  The independent 
variable of interest is the number of opportunistic trades each insider has in our sample; 
we also explore an indicator variable that takes the value of one for opportunistic 
insiders and zero otherwise. 
Column 1 of Panel B shows that while simply being opportunistic increases the 
likelihood of SEC investigation (and is marginally significant), the number of trades 
seems to be a statistically stronger predictor.  However, this hides interesting variation, 
as in Column 2 we split this number of trades into its two components: number of 
opportunistic and number of routine trades.  Column 2 of Panel B indicates that the 
number of opportunistic trades is a positive and significant predictor of the likelihood of 
being investigated by the SEC, while the number of routine trades is not.  In other 
words, insider trading that reliably predicts future SEC action is opportunistic, not 
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routine, trading.  In terms of magnitude, we find that opportunistic trading roughly 
doubles the likelihood of investigation (a one-standard deviation move in opportunistic 
trades increases the probability of investigation to 0.08%, up from 0.04%).  This 
increase is small in an absolute sense, given the small absolute number of enforcement 
actions taken by the SEC.  Column 3 indicates that the share of opportunistic trades is 
also a significant predictor of future investigations.  Finally, Column 4 shows that it is 
specifically the number of opportunistic sells that increases the likelihood of a future 
SEC investigation, again highlighting the power of our classification scheme to 
specifically identify informative insider sells, in contrast to much of the literature.      
Collectively these results suggest an interesting, and coherent, link between SEC 
activity and opportunistic trading.  Since opportunistic trades are a significant predictor 
of the likelihood of being investigated by the SEC, it is not surprising that opportunistic 
trading decreases significantly following recent releases from the SEC regarding illegal 
insider trading cases, consistent with the idea that opportunistic traders dampen their 
trading activity when the potential costs of illegal trading increase.    
   
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper we employ a simple empirical strategy to decode the information in 
insider trading.  Our analysis rests on the basic premise that insiders, while possessing 
private information, trade for many reasons, and that by identifying ex-ante those 
insiders whose trades are “routine” (and hence uninformative), one can better isolate 
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the true information that insiders contain about the future of firms.  Using simple 
definitions of routine traders, we are able to systematically and predictably identify 
insiders as either opportunistic or routine throughout our sample.  We show that 
stripping away the uninformative signals of routine traders leaves a set of information-
rich opportunistic trades that are powerful predictors of future firm returns, news, and 
events.  
We show that while the abnormal returns associated with routine traders are 
essentially zero, a portfolio strategy that instead focuses solely on opportunistic insider 
trades yields value-weighted (equal-weighted) abnormal returns of 82 basis points per 
month (180 basis points per month).  Similarly, in a regression context the combined 
differences in the coefficients between opportunistic trades and routine trades translate 
into an increase of 158 basis points per month in the predictive ability of opportunistic 
trades relative to routine trades.  Further, this effect increases with the strength of the 
opportunistic signal (as measured by the number of trades or trade-size intensity), but 
is unrelated to the strength of the routine signal.   
In exploring the mechanism at work behind our identification and return results, 
we demonstrate that trades by opportunistic insiders predict future firm news and 
future firm events, while trades by routine insiders do not.  Opportunistic traders have 
particular predictive ability for the information in future firm-level announcements such 
as earnings forecasts and managerial forecasts.  The most informed opportunistic traders 
tend to be local non-senior opportunistic insiders, and these traders are likely to come 
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from geographically concentrated firms and poorly governed firms.    
Further, we find that opportunistic trading increases the likelihood of SEC 
enforcement against insiders (while routine trading has no impact). Also, opportunistic 
traders decrease their trading activity in the wake of increases in the number of news 
releases by the SEC regarding illegal insider trading cases, consistent with the idea that 
opportunistic traders are sensitive to the potential costs of illegal insider trading.  
Finally, we find suggestive evidence that institutional investors mimic the trading of 
opportunistic (but not routine) traders, and yet provide contemporaneous liquidity to 
(less informative) routine traders.  
Collectively our results suggest that it is possible to identify, out of the hundreds 
of thousands of investors who trade in the market each year, which traders are truly 
informed.  More generally, decoding the true information in other activities in the 
market, such as the trades made by banks or institutional investors, may also be a 
promising avenue.  These insights could allow us to understand new characteristics of 
other informed financial agents and the exact type of information these informed agents 
possess, which would help investors, market regulators, and all active participants in 
securities markets develop a clearer picture of the information environment that helps 
form asset prices.   
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1 From the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website: 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#intro. 
2 From the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website: 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#intro. 
3 The name of the firm, the insiders, and the dates involved, have been disguised. 
4 The Internet Appendix can be found at http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp. 
5 A related strand of the literature studies insiders’ ability to forecast the time series of 
aggregate stock returns (see, for example, Seyhun (1988, 1992, 1998) and Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001), among others), and the time-series variation in the value premium (see 
Knewtson, Sias, and Whidbee (2010)), subjects we do not explore in this paper.  See 
also Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) for cross-country evidence on insider trading laws 
and stock price informativeness.    
6 See also Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006), and Elliott, Morse, and Richardson 
(1984) for other evidence of insiders trading around news events. 
7 See also Sen (2008) and Henderson, Jagolinzer, and Mueller (2010) for more evidence 
on 10b5-1 plans. 
8 See Jeng et al. (2003) for details on data issues with Form 4. 
9 We have experimented with different back-windows (e.g., two, three, four, and five 
years) of past trading in the same calendar month.  We find similar results in both 
magnitude and significance for all windows. We show the results using a three year 
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back-window throughout the paper. 
10 For instance, in Appendix Table A1 we present results that employ a rolling-window 
approach that allows each insider to be reclassified each year based on the last three 
rolling years of data.  This approach effectively allows each insider to switch back and 
forth between being an opportunistic and routine insider. Table A1 shows that both 
opportunistic buys and sells are large and significant predictors of future returns: from 
Column 3 the coefficient on opportunistic buys is 0.715 (t=4.15), and from Column 6 
the coefficient on opportunistic sells is -0.605 (t=4.30); meanwhile both routine buys 
and sells are uninformative for future returns.   
11 If we modify our approach with the goal of maximizing the number of insider trades 
that we capture in our tests, our results are unchanged.  For example, by utilizing all 
transactions (e.g., options transactions) during the classification period in order to 
identify opportunistic/routine insiders, rather than just purchase/sale transactions as we 
do in the paper, and by including all trades that are currently in the classification 
period in the tests, we can capture over 76% of all insider trades (and 93% of firm-
months) in our return tests and obtain similar results: e.g., opportunistic buys predict 
future returns of 98 basis points per month (t=12.25), and opportunistic sells predict 
future returns of -33 basis points per month (t=4.61) using this modified approach.  
12 Note that the average number of trades listed here only includes trades made after we 
classify an insider as opportunistic or routine. All insiders in our sample have at least 
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three more years worth of trades that we use to classify insiders, but that we do not use 
in our subsequent tests. 
13 The test of equality of routine and opportunistic coefficients is based on the point 
estimates and the robust covariance matrix of the estimates (clustered at the firm level). 
14 From column 6, the difference is 158 bp [=(57-(-20)-(-67-14)]. 
15 Daniel and Titman (1997, 1998) suggest that characteristics can be better predictors 
of future returns than factor loadings.  Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers (1997), we subtract from each stock return the return on a portfolio of firms 
matched on market equity, market-book, and prior one-year return quintiles (a total of 
125 matching portfolios). These 125 portfolios are reformed every month based on the 
market equity, M/B ratio, and prior year return from the previous month. The 
portfolios are equal weighted and the quintiles are defined with respect to the entire 
CRSP universe in that month.  We term these abnormal returns DGTW characteristic-
adjusted returns. 
16 We have also experimented with various “trade-weighted” portfolio returns, and these 
results are similar to those reported here.  For instance, Appendix Table A8 employs 
three different portfolio weighting schemes: 1) weighting by dollar trade size (using 
“tprice,” the self-reported transaction price), 2) weighting by dollar trade size (using 
CRSP end-of-day closing price for transaction price), and 3) weighting by percentage of 
shares outstanding.  As Table A8 shows, all three weighting schemes yield similar 
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results.  The long-short (buys minus sells) opportunistic portfolio earns average 
abnormal returns ranging from 101 to 153 basis points per month (with t-stats ranging 
from 2.10 to 3.04), depending on the particular risk-adjustment and weighting scheme 
used.  Meanwhile the long-short (buys minus sells) routine portfolio spread is much 
smaller in magnitude, and is always insignificant.  
17 Note that we have also run all tests in Tables II and A9 using Fama-MacBeth 
regressions, as well as pooled regressions with month and firm fixed effects, and the 
results are very similar.  For instance, the analog of the full specification in Table A9, 
Column 9 using a Fama-MacBeth estimation gives buy and sell coefficients of 0.70 
(t=3.72) and -0.40 (t=-2.86), and using month and firm fixed effects gives coefficients of 
0.56 (t=2.46) and -0.21 (t=2.23). 
18 We have experimented with a variety of other definitions for blackout windows, and 
the results are similar to those presented here. 
19 We exclude other firm events such as earnings announcements and dividend 
announcements that are often pre-scheduled far in advance and subject to explicit 
insider trading blackout periods. 
20 Note that not all insiders are necessarily directors.  The class of insiders includes non-
directors, inside directors, and outside directors. 
21 We have also examined the characteristics of opportunistic versus routine traders in a 
logit framework.  Their characteristics are, by and large, remarkably similar; e.g., the 
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percentage of insiders that are local, independent, or senior, are not reliably different 
across the two groups.  
22 We thank Diego Garcia and Oyvind Norli for graciously providing their data on state-
level operations of firms. 
23Again the independent variables in this table are measured at the end of each insider’s 
classification period, which occurs the first time an insider trades for three straight 
years; we have variation in the number of years active because different insiders trade 
for a different number of years before they have a string of three consecutive years with 
a trade.  
24 Summary statistics for our litigation data are as follows: The average number of 
insider-trading-related press releases the SEC makes in a given month is 6.8 (median 6), 
with a standard deviation of 5.3 (max=36, 75th percentile=9, 25th percentile=3, min=0).   
  
Figure 1: Returns to Opportunistic Trades, Event-time Returns 
 
This figure shows the event-time returns to portfolios that follow the trades of opportunistic and routine insiders from 1989 to 2007. Opportunistic 
trades are defined as in Table I, as are routine trades.  This figure presents the difference in performance following opportunistic versus routine 
buys (dashed line), opportunistic versus routine sells (dotted line), and of the buy-sell, opportunistic-routine spread portfolio (solid line), over 12 
months following portfolio formation.  
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Table I: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents an overview of the sample we use in this paper, for which we can define programs 
(Partitionable Universe), compared to the entire TFN Insiders database (Insider Universe), between 1989 
and 2007. Each year, the partitionable universe is that universe of insiders who have at least one trade in 
each of the preceding 3 years (so that routine traders and opportunistic traders can be defined). Panel A 
presents firm-level characteristics, with all numbers being full sample averages (medians), except for # of 
unique companies, which is the total number of unique companies over the entire sample period.  Size is 
defined as the market capitalization of the firm in millions of dollars.  Book-to-markets that are negative, 
or greater than 100 (likely mistakes in the data) are excluded from the data. Panel B presents insider-
level characteristics for both the Partitionable Universe and the Insider Universe. Trades over the last 
three years are used to characterize insiders as either routine or opportunistic traders. All subsequent 
trades that are made after we classify each insider as either routine or opportunistic are then placed into 
one of two buckets: a) “routine trades” (i.e., all trades made by routine traders), and b “opportunistic 
trades” (i.e., all trades made by opportunistic traders).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Firm-Level Characteristics 
 Partitionable Universe Insider Universe 
 Average Median Average Median 
Size 3274 330 1604 117
Size percentile 63.95% 69.57% 52.38% 53.93%
Book-to-market 0.66 0.47 0.84 0.55
Book-to-market percentile 42.52% 39.18% 47.47% 45.43%
# buys/ company 21.10 2 31.45 15 
# sells/ company 68.89 6 59.17 20 
# of unique companies 5493 15276  
Panel B: Insider-Level Characteristics 
 Partitionable Universe Insider Universe 
 Average Median Average Median 
# buys/ insider 4.79 0 2.35 1 
Buy trade size (bps) 16.62 1.94 14.93 1.61
% all buys that are routine 64.44%   
% all buys that are opportunistic 35.56%   
# sells/ insider 8.24 1 4.06 1 
Sell trade size (bps) 13.15 3.00 25.59 3.72
% all sells that are routine 52.02%   
% all sells that are opportunistic 47.98%   
# companies/ insider 2.23 2 2.29 2 
   
% all trades that are routine 54.81%   
% all trades that are opportunistic 45.19%   
  
Table II: Performance of Routine and Opportunistic Trades 
 
This table reports pooled regressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior 
month, over our 1989-2007 sample period.  The dependent variable in each is future one-month returns 
(RET).  Routine and opportunistic trades are defined as in Table I.  Opportunistic Buy is a categorical 
variable equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero 
otherwise. Routine Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any routine buys on a given firm in 
the prior month, and zero otherwise.  Opportunistic Sell and Routine Sell are defined equivalently for insider 
sales.  Size and BM are the natural logarithms of the firm characteristics of market equity and book-to-
market of the given firm.  Past Month (Year) Returns are the return of the given firm over the prior month 
(year, excluding the prior month (t-2,t-12)).  Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated.  
Standard errors clustered at the firm level.  t-statistics are shown below the estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% 
statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Opportunistic Buy 1.02*** 0.90***   0.65*** 0.57** 
 (5.24) (4.64)   (2.60) (2.30) 
Routine Buy 0.30* 0.14   -0.08 -0.20 
     (1.73) (0.81)   (-0.32) (-0.84) 
Opportunistic Sell   -0.95*** -0.78*** -0.75*** -0.67*** 
       (-6.65) (-5.67) (-3.64) (-3.37) 
Routine Sell   -0.02 0.04 0.16 0.14 
       (-0.13) (0.24) (0.77) (0.69) 
Size -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.23*** -0.20*** -0.22*** -0.20*** 
     (-5.19) (-4.55) (-5.38) (-4.70) (-5.20) (-4.56) 
BM 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 
     (3.13) (3.30) (3.26) (3.42) (3.23) (3.40) 
Past Month Returns -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05*** 
     (-4.00) (-6.09) (-3.93) (-6.03) (-3.90) (-6.01) 
Past Year Returns 0.005*** 0.01*** 0.005*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
     (3.68) (4.71) (3.81) (4.80) (3.82) (4.79) 
Fixed Effect  Month Month Month
Number of observations 48,460 48,460 48,460 48,460 48,460 48,460 
  
Table III: Performance of Routine and Opportunistic Trades, Trade-Level Classification 
 
This table reports pooled regressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior 
month, over our 1989-2007 sample period.  The dependent variable in each is future one-month returns in 
month t+1 (RET). To define routine trades, we investigate insiders’ trading patterns in the three preceding 
years. If an insider traded a stock in the same calendar month in three consecutive years, all trades he or she 
made subsequently in the same month are labeled as routine and trades made in a different month are labeled 
opportunistic. If an insider traded in three consecutive years, but no trades were made in the same month in 
these three years, all subsequent trades of that insider are labeled as opportunistic as well. Opportunistic Buy 
is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given firm in the prior month 
(month t), and zero otherwise. Routine Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any routine 
buys on a given firm in the prior month (month t), and zero otherwise.  Opportunistic Sell and Routine Sell 
are defined equivalently for insider sales.  Size and BM are the natural logarithms of the firm characteristics 
of market equity and book-to-market of the given firm.  Past Month (Year) Returns are the return of the 
given firm over the prior month (year, excluding the prior month (t-2,t-12)).  Month fixed effects (Month) are 
included where indicated.  Standard errors clustered at the firm level.  t-statistics are shown below the 
estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Opportunistic Buys 0.77*** 0.65***   
 (4.39) (3.79)   
Routine Buys -0.21 -0.29   
     (-1.14) (-1.57)   
Opportunistic Sells   -0.77*** -0.63*** 
   (-4.66) (-3.84) 
Routine Sells   0.44*** 0.31** 
       (3.06) (2.29) 
Size -0.23*** -0.20*** -0.24*** -0.21*** 
     (-5.50) (-4.76) (-5.60) (-4.83) 
BM 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 
     (3.35) (3.47) (3.42) (3.52) 
Past Month Returns -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05*** 
     (-4.28) (-6.31) (-4.30) (-6.33) 
Past Year Returns 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 
     (3.69) (4.72) (3.70) (4.72) 
Fixed Effect Month Month 
Number of observations 48,460 48,460 48,460 48,460 
  
Table IV: Portfolio Returns to Routine and Opportunistic Trades 
 
This table shows the returns to buy and sell portfolios that follow the routine and opportunistic trades in our opportunistic universe from 1989-
2007. Opportunistic and routine trades are defined as in Table I.  A firm is included in the opportunistic buy portfolio, for example, in month 
(t+1) if any of its insiders placed an opportunistic buy on the firm in month t.  At the end of the month (t+1), we rebalance the portfolios based 
on new insider trades. Below are the monthly returns to these opportunistic and routine buy and sell portfolios in percentages, shown for both 
equal and value weighting.  Panel A shows results for equal-weighted portfolios, while Panel B shows results for value-weighted portfolios.  t-
statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Equal- 
weighted 
Opportunistic
Buys 
Routine 
Buys L/S Buys 
Opportunistic  
Sells 
Routine 
Sells L/S Sells 
Opportunistic
(Buys-Sells) 
Routine
(Buys-Sells) 
Average returns 2.33 1.65 0.68 0.77 1.41 -0.63 1.55 0.25
Standard dev. 4.95 4.06 3.03 5.97 6.01 2.64 4.91 4.67
CAPM alpha 1.51*** 0.92*** 0.59*** -0.30 0.32 -0.61*** 1.81*** 0.60** 
 (5.89) (4.34) (2.98) (-1.31) (1.44) (-3.47) (5.86) (2.25) 
Fama-French alpha 1.20*** 0.64*** 0.56*** -0.21 0.43*** -0.65*** 1.41*** 0.20 
 (5.49) (3.78) (2.74) (-1.34) (2.72) (-3.60) (5.04) (0.87) 
Carhart alpha 1.45*** 0.82*** 0.63*** -0.19 0.38** -0.57*** 1.64*** 0.44* 
 (6.82) (4.92) (3.03) (-1.18) (2.32) (-3.11) (5.86) (1.89) 
DGTW Char Adj 1.24*** 0.40** 0.83*** -0.27** 0.42*** -0.69*** 1.51*** -0.02 
 (4.99) (2.00) (3.39) (-2.09) (2.75) (-4.52) (4.98) (-0.06) 
5-Factor alpha 1.58*** 0.87*** 0.70*** -0.23 0.45*** -0.67*** 1.80*** 0.43* 
 (7.03) (5.00) (3.18) (-1.30) (2.59) (-3.48) (6.07) (1.73) 
Panel B: Value-
weighted 
Opportunistic 
Buys 
Routine 
Buys L/S Buys 
Opportunistic  
Sells 
Routine 
Sells L/S Sells 
Opportunistic
(Buys-Sells) 
Routine
(Buys-Sells) 
Average returns 1.79 1.27 0.52 0.72 1.00 -0.29 1.08 0.27
Standard dev. 5.96 5.02 5.27 5.70 6.16 2.92 5.88 5.97
CAPM alpha 0.87*** 0.45* 0.42 -0.34* -0.09 -0.25 1.22*** 0.55 
 (2.88) (1.73) (1.20) (-1.73) (-0.39) (-1.29) (3.14) (1.44) 
Fama-French alpha 0.64** 0.18 0.46 -0.08 0.28 -0.36 0.72** -0.09 
 (2.16) (0.75) (1.27) (-0.46) (1.35) (-1.83) (2.06) (-0.29) 
Carhart alpha 0.52* 0.09 0.43 -0.09 0.17 -0.26 0.62* -0.07 
 (1.73) (0.37) (1.16) (-0.50) (0.80) (-1.29) (1.71) (-0.22) 
DGTW Char Adj 0.57** 0.26 0.31 -0.18 0.06 -0.24 0.75** 0.21 
 (2.35) (1.26) (1.04) (-1.29) (0.31) (-1.46) (2.48) (0.72) 
5-Factor alpha 0.72** 0.09 0.63 -0.10 0.29 -0.39* 0.82** -0.20 
 (2.27) (0.34) (1.61) (-0.49) (1.32) (-1.84) (2.15) (-0.57) 
  
Table V: Opportunistic Trades and the Arrival of Information 
 
This table reports panel regressions of information events on the number of routine and opportunistic trades 
in a company in the prior month, over the 1989-2000 sample period for which we have news data. The 
dependent variables in the regressions are: in Columns 1 and 2, a proxy for firm information environment 
using the number of news, annual and quarterly earnings forecast revisions, recommendation changes, SEO 
and M&A activities (All Firm Info), in Columns 3 and 4, solely the number of news (News).   The main 
independent variables of interest are the Number of Opportunistic Trades and the Number of Routine Trades, 
defined as the log(1+number of opportunistic (routine) trades) in the previous month. Past 1 Month News is 
equal to the number of information events (for each respective specification of information events) observed 
for the given firm in the prior month, while Past 6 Month News is defined equivalently for information events 
of the firm in the 6 months prior to last month.  The other independent variables are defined in Table II.  
Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 
the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Type of Information: All Firm Info All Firm Info News News 
Number of Opportunistic Trades 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
     (2.72) (2.78) (2.90) (3.26) 
Number of Routine Trades -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 
     (-0.11) (1.33) (0.46) (1.04) 
Size 0.10*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
     (16.49) (8.01) (5.28) (4.96) 
BM -0.04*** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.01 
     (-3.16) (-1.58) (-3.51) (-1.46) 
Past Month Returns -0.00* 0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 
     (-1.76) (2.86) (-0.78) (3.98) 
Past Year Returns 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      (0.75) (1.15) (1.42) (1.13) 
Past Month News 0.58*** 0.22*** 0.73*** 0.28*** 
 (38.68) (19.33) (54.36) (18.83) 
Past 6 Month News  0.46***  0.39*** 
       (54.89)  (65.79) 
Fixed Effect Month Month Month Month 
Number of observations 20,198 20,198 20,198 20,198 
  
Table VI: What Insiders Predict and Who Mimics Their Trades 
 
This table reports: i.) panel regressions of announcement returns surrounding information events on the number of routine and opportunistic trades in a company in the month prior to 
the announcement (Columns 1-5), and ii.) panel regressions of changes in institutional holdings of a given stock on lagged and contemporaneous routine and opportunistic insider 
trades.  As in Table V, the sample period is 1989-2000 for news and 1989-2007 for the remaining announcements.  The dependent variables in the regressions are, for Columns 1-5 
announcement returns on days (t-1,t+1) for the following events: News (described in Table V), Analysts’ earnings forecasts + recommendations, Analysts’ earnings forecasts, 
Managerial guidance forecasts, and Earnings Announcements.  In Columns 6-8, the dependent variable is Change in total institutional holdings for the given stock being considered.  
The main independent variables of interest are: i.) the Number of Opportunistic Buys (Sells) and the Number of Routine Buys (Sells), defined as in Table V; these are the previous 
month insider trades for Columns 1-5, and previous two quarters’ insider trades for the institutional holdings tests in Columns 6-8, and ii.) the Contemporaneous Opportunistic and 
Routine Insider Trades; these are the insider trades in the same quarter as the change in institutional holdings, so trading of insiders contemporaneous with trading of the institutions.  
Size, B/M, and previous year returns (defined in Table II) are included as controls where indicated.  Month fixed effects (Month) are also included where indicated. All standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep Variable News Analysts:
All Forecasts
Analysts:
Earnings Fcsts
Management 
Forecasts 
Earnings
Announcements
Change in Instnl Holdings
Number of Opp Buys 0.29** 0.13* 0.17** 1.05** 0.30** 0.116 0.195** 0.169**
 (2.59) (1.78) (2.17) (2.46) (1.96)  (1.53) (2.44) (2.13) 
Number of Opp Sells -0.22*** -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.197*** -0.129* -0.098 
     (-4.91) (-1.52) (-0.91) (-0.53) (-0.17)  (-2.77) (-1.77) (-1.28) 
Number of Rtn Buys -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.086 0.156* 0.114 
     (-0.89) (0.01) (-0.08) (-0.07) (0.84)  (1.12) (1.92) (1.38) 
Number of Rtn Sells 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.37*** 0.12 -0.007 0.033 0.083 
     (1.30) (1.56) (1.25) (3.67) (1.41)  (-0.08) (0.33) (0.78) 
Contemporaneous      -0.107 -0.116 -0.033 
Number of Opp Buys       (-1.03) (-1.13) (-0.32) 
Contemporaneous      0.035 0.103 0.093 
Number of Opp Sells           (0.32) (0.94) (0.85) 
Contemporaneous      -0.234** -0.247** -0.203* 
Number of Rtn Buys           (-2.12) (-2.20) (-1.69) 
Contemporaneous      -0.176 -0.092 -0.120 
Number of Rtn Sells            (-1.26) (-0.68) (-0.88) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect  Month Month
Num of obs 195,155 272,276 229,764 12,568 43,442 15,537 15,537 14,521 
  
Table VII: Which Opportunistic Traders Are the Most Informed? 
 
This table reports panel regressions of information events on the number of opportunistic trades by various 
insider types in a company in the prior month, over our 1989-2007 sample period. The dependent variable in 
the regressions is a proxy for the firm information environment using the number of news, annual and 
quarterly earnings forecast revisions, recommendation changes, SEO and M&A activities.  The main 
independent variables of interest are the Number of Opportunistic Trades, as defined in Table V, for various 
types of insiders.  The types of insiders we consider are: Local Insiders (defined as insiders that reside in the 
same state as their firm’s headquarters), Senior Officers of the firm (defined as CEO, CFO, or Chairman of 
the Board), Inside Directors, and Independent Directors of the firm.  Past 1 and Past 6 Month News are 
defined as in Table V.  The other independent variables are defined in Table II.  Month fixed effects (Month) 
are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, and t-stats 
using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 
10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Opportunistic Trades by Local Insiders 0.03***    0.03** 
     (2.85)    (2.22) 
Opportunistic Trades by Independent Directors  0.02   0.01 
  (1.50)   (0.41) 
Opportunistic Trades by Senior Insiders    0.01  0.00 
       (0.96)  (-0.11) 
Opportunistic Trades by Inside Directors    0.01 0.01 
        (0.60) (0.52) 
Trades by Routine Insiders 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
     (0.93) (-0.04) (0.53) (0.39) (0.51) 
Size 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
     (7.92) (7.03) (7.93) (7.93) (7.01) 
BM -0.01* -0.02* -0.01* -0.01* -0.02* 
     (-1.71) (-1.90) (-1.79) (-1.83) (-1.74) 
Past Month Returns 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
     (2.93) (2.69) (3.06) (3.09) (2.50) 
Past Year Returns 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      (1.12) (1.08) (1.18) (1.20) (1.02) 
Past Month News 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
      (19.21) (15.63) (19.08) (19.10) (15.77) 
Past 6 Month News 0.46*** 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.49***
     
(54.90) (36.40) (54.77) (54.78) (36.58) 
Fixed Effect Month Month Month Month Month
Number of observations 20,198 12,221 20,198 20,198 12,221 
  
Table VIII: Who are the Informed Insiders? 
 
This table reports logit regressions of being a local opportunistic non-senior insider on a number of insider-
level and firm-level characteristics, over our 1989-2007 sample period.  The dependent variable is at the 
insider level, and is equal to 1 for local opportunistic non-senior (informed) insiders, and zero otherwise.  Each 
insider, and so each independent variable, is defined when the insider is labeled as routine or opportunistic 
(after the insider trades three years in a row for the first time, in December of the third year with trades).  
The main independent variables of interest are: Number of Years Active, the number of years the given 
insider has been trading; Number of Trades, the number of trades the given insider has made; # of States 
Operate In is log(1+the total number of states that the given firm has operations in); Herfindahl Index is a 
Herfindahl index of the firms operations (sales) across all states in which it operates; % Ops in Home State is 
the percentage of the firm’s operations located in the Headquarters state; Governance (G) Index is the 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index of a firm’s corporate governance; Poorly Governed Firm is a 
categorical variable equal to 1 if the firm is above the 90th percentile in terms of poor governance score by the 
G Index; Number of Product Offerings is the number of products that the firm reports to sell. Past returns 
(Std Deviation) are defined as the return (monthly return standard deviation) in the three years prior to 
classification.  Firm Size and BM are described in Table II. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 
the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of Years Active 0.675***       
 (7.47)       
Number of Trades -0.692***       
 (-20.59)       
Geo Dispersion: # States Operate In  -0.074**      
      (-2.34)      
Geo Dispersion: Herfindahl Index   0.436***     
       (3.87)     
Geo Dispersion: % Ops in Home State    0.664***    
        (6.60)    
Governance (G) Index     0.034**   
         (2.01)   
Poorly Governed Firm      0.327**  
          (2.19)  
Number of  Product Offerings       0.149** 
           (2.37) 
Past Firm Returns 0.084*** 0.068** 0.067** 0.063** 0.115 0.103 0.084** 
      (3.20) (2.46) (2.41) (2.28) (1.34) (1.22) (2.08) 
Past Firm Std Deviation -0.408 -0.478 -0.417 -0.380 0.142 0.064 -0.610 
      (-1.44) (-1.57) (-1.37) (-1.22) (0.18) (0.08) (-1.36) 
Size 0.067*** 0.114*** 0.120*** 0.130*** 0.063** 0.067** 0.104***
     (5.12) (7.15) (7.48) (8.10) (2.02) (2.14) (4.01) 
BM 0.006 0.063* 0.061* 0.071** -0.0001 0.005 0.012 
     (0.20) (1.75) (1.71) (1.97) (-0.002) (0.09) (0.24) 
Number of observations 10,283 6,971 6,971 6,944 2,082 2,082 2,831 
  
Table IX: SEC Activity and Opportunistic Trading 
 
This table explores the link between opportunistic trading and SEC investigations.  The sample period is 
1989-2007.  Panel A reports regressions of the fraction of insiders trading in a given month who are 
opportunistic on recent SEC releases regarding litigation cases against illegal insider trading.  The dependent 
variable is the number of opportunistic insiders trading in month t+1 divided by the number of all insiders 
trading in month t+1.  The independent variable of interest is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of SEC releases regarding litigation cases against illegal insider activity in month t.  Panel B reports 
logit regressions of being investigated by the SEC. The observations are at the insider level and insider 
characteristics are recorded as of the end of the sample (e.g., the number of trades is the total number of 
trades the insider has in the sample). The independent variable of interest is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one for opportunistic insiders and the number of or the fraction of opportunistic trades. The 
fraction of opportunistic trades is equal to one for opportunistic insiders. For routine insiders, the fraction is 
equal to zero if a given insider always trades in the “routine month” (the same month that she traded for the 
past 3 years), and can be greater than zero (but lower than one) if the insider also has some trades that are 
made in “non-routine” months. We also include control variables for the fraction of opportunistic insiders 
trading in month t and month t-1, the CRSP value-weight market return in month t, the standard deviation 
of daily market returns in month t, and various windows of past cumulative market returns (month t-3 to t-1, 
month t-6 to t-1, and month t-12 to t-1).  t-stats based on robust standard errors are included in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: How Opportunistic Trading is affected by SEC Actions against insider trading 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Num SEC Releasest  -0.019*** -0.012** -0.013** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.015** 
     (-2.65) (-1.99) (-2.17) (-2.26) (-2.24) (-2.35) (-2.41) 
Fraction Insiderst  0.588*** 0.390*** 0.357*** 0.352*** 0.323*** 0.249*** 
      (8.77) (4.77) (4.21) (4.15) (3.84) (3.00) 
Fraction Insiderst-1   0.336*** 0.352*** 0.347*** 0.320*** 0.241*** 
       (4.59) (4.90) (4.74) (4.28) (3.07) 
Market Returnt    0.182** 0.158 0.132 0.089 
        (2.04) (1.39) (1.34) (0.95) 
StdMarketRett    0.192 0.382 0.761 1.384 
        (0.21) (0.38) (0.73) (1.44) 
Market Returnt-3,t-1     0.033   
          (-0.48)   
Market Returnt-6,t-1      0.079*  
      (1.67)  
Market Returnt-12,t-1       0.116*** 
            (3.76) 
Number of 
observations 147 147 147 146 146 146 146 
  
 
 
Panel B:  Probability of being investigated by the SEC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Opportunistic Dummy 1.368* 1.725* 0.057 0.931 
(1.65) (1.69) (0.07) (1.12) 
Total Num of Insider Trades 0.849**    
(2.54)    
Num of Routine Trades 0.270  
(0.98)  
Num of Opportunistic Trades 0.925**  
 (2.42)  
% Opportunistic Trades   1.653***  
   (3.77)  
Num of Opportunistic Buys    0.194 
    (0.51) 
Num of Opportunistic Sells  0.945*** 
 (2.87) 
Number of Observations 11632 11632 11632 11632 
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Figure A1: ABC, Inc. Example 
 
This figure plots the stock prices of ABC, Inc. between December 1997 and January 1998.  Prices are normalized to equal 1 on the day of Mr. 
Johnson’s (opportunistic insider) trade (12/07/1997 = 1). 
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Figure A2: Size distribution 
 
This figure plots the distribution of market capitalization of the opportunistic and routine trade sample. 
Every calendar month we assign stocks to size deciles using NYSE breakpoint. We plot the % of stocks in 
each size bin between 1989 and 2007.  D1 refers to the smallest decile of stocks, and D10 refers to the 
largest decile of stocks.  
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Table A1: Performance of Routine and Opportunistic Trades,  
Rolling Window Classification 
 
This table reports pooled regressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the 
prior month, from 1989-2007.  The dependent variable in each is future one-month returns in month t+1 
(RET). Routine and Opportunistic traders are here defined using rolling window definitions.  Specifically, 
at any point that an insider has a three year window of trades (trades in three consecutive years), we first 
classify her based on this three year window as opportunistic or routine (as described in Table I).  We 
then roll this three year window forward a year, and reclassify the insider each year (as long as we have 
the three consecutive years of trading).  If we do not have the three consecutive years in the following 
year, we retain the insider’s last classification until we do.  Opportunistic Buy is a categorical variable 
equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given firm in the prior month (month t), and zero 
otherwise. Routine Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any routine buys on a given 
firm in the prior month (month t), and zero otherwise.  Opportunistic Sell and Routine Sell are defined 
equivalently for insider sales.  Size and BM are the natural logarithms of the firm characteristics of 
market equity and book-to-market of the given firm.  Past Month (Year) Returns are the return of the 
given firm over the prior month (year, excluding the prior month (t-2,t-12)).  Month fixed effects (Month) 
are included where indicated.  Standard errors clustered at the firm level.  t-statistics are shown below the 
estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Opportunistic Buys 1.337*** 0.881*** 0.715***    
 (8.69) (5.06) (4.15)    
Routine Buys 0.787*** 0.197 0.052    
     (4.63) (1.07) (0.29)    
Opportunistic Sells    -1.303*** -0.784*** -0.605*** 
    (-10.01) (-5.39) (-4.30) 
Routine Sells    -0.626*** -0.082 -0.009 
        (-3.53) (-0.44) (-0.05) 
Size  -0.225*** -0.199***  -0.226*** -0.199*** 
      (-5.23) (-4.62)  (-5.24) (-4.61) 
BM  0.364*** 0.376***  0.372*** 0.384*** 
      (3.18) (3.37)  (3.24) (3.43) 
Past Month Returns  -0.031*** -0.049***  -0.031*** -0.049*** 
      (-4.02) (-6.11)  (-3.97) (-6.07) 
Past Year Returns  0.005*** 0.006***  0.005*** 0.006*** 
      (3.68) (4.72)  (3.74) (4.75) 
Fixed Effect  Month  Month
Number of observations 52,444 48,460 48,460 52,444 48,460 48,460 
  
Table A2: Portfolio Returns to Insider Trades, Young Versus Old Companies 
 
This table shows the returns to insider buys and insider sells in young companies (those insider trades that are made within three years of the 
company’s first appearance in CRSP) and old companies (those insider trades that are made three or more years after the company’s first 
appearance in CRSP).  The sample period is 1989-2007. A firm is included in the buy (sell) portfolio in month (t+1) if any of its insiders bought 
(sold) on the firm in month t.  At the end of the month (t+1), we rebalance the portfolios based on new insider trades. Below are the monthly 
returns to and alphas on these buy and sell portfolios, in percentages, shown for both equal (in Panel A) and value weighting (in Panel B).  t-
statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Young Companies Old Companies Young Minus Old 
Panel A: Equal weights Buys Sells Buys-Sells Buys Sells Buys-Sells Buys Sells Buys-Sells 
Average returns 1.73 0.56 1.17 1.95 0.75 1.20 -0.21 -0.18 -0.03 
Standard dev. 6.55 8.07 3.45 5.27 5.34 2.27 2.94 4.11 3.02 
CAPM alpha 0.91*** -0.38 1.29*** 1.20*** -0.04 1.24*** -0.29 -0.34 0.05 
 (3.62) (-1.28) (6.70) (6.37) (-0.28) (9.22) (-1.68) (-1.48) (0.28) 
Fama-French alpha 0.95*** -0.19 1.14 1.04*** -0.11 1.15*** -0.09 -0.08 -0.01 
 (4.61) (-1.04) (6.82) (7.34) (-1.51) (8.92) (-0.64) (-0.45) (-0.09) 
Carhart alpha 1.28*** 0.05 1.22*** 1.31*** -0.10 1.41*** -0.03 0.15 -0.19 
 (6.70) (0.31) (7.22) (10.45) (-1.36) (12.74) (-0.22) (0.89) (-1.14) 
 Young Companies Old Companies Young Minus Old 
Panel B: Value weights Buys Sells Buys-Sells Buys Sells Buys-Sells Buys Sells Buys-Sells 
Average returns 0.96 0.74 0.22 1.07 0.64 0.42 -0.11 0.10 -0.21 
Standard dev. 6.67 8.53 4.47 4.95 4.77 2.25 4.58 5.63 4.64 
CAPM alpha 0.10 -0.25 0.34 0.29*** -0.14** 0.43*** -0.20 -0.11 -0.09 
 (0.43) (-0.81) (1.33) (2.55) (-2.35) (3.18) (-0.73) (-0.34) (-0.34) 
Fama-French alpha 0.22 0.05 0.17 0.23** -0.11* 0.33** 0.00 0.16 -0.16 
 (1.13) (0.22) (0.73) (2.03) (-1.87) (2.56) (-0.01) (0.68) (-0.60) 
Carhart alpha 0.21 -0.04 0.26 0.35*** -0.15*** 0.50*** -0.14 0.11 -0.24 
 (1.05) (-0.19) (1.04) (3.20) (-2.59) (3.97) (-0.58) (0.46) (-0.90) 
  
 
 
Table A3: Portfolio Returns to Insider Trades, Young Versus Old Insiders 
 
This table shows the returns to buys and sells of young insiders (those insider trades that are made within three years of a given insider’s first 
trade in the database) and of old insiders (those insider trades that are made three or more years after a given insider’s first trade in the 
database).  The sample period is 1989-2007. A firm is included in the buy (sell) portfolio in month (t+1) if any of its insiders bought (sold) on the 
firm in month t.  At the end of the month (t+1), we rebalance the portfolios based on new insider trades. Below are the monthly returns to and 
alphas on these buy and sell portfolios, in percentages, shown for both equal (in Panel A) and value weighting (in Panel B).  t-statistics are shown 
in parentheses, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Young Insiders Old Insiders Young Minus Old 
Panel A: Equal weights Buys Sells Buys-Sells Buys Sells Buys-Sells Buys Sells Buys-Sells 
Average returns 1.95 0.65 1.30 1.98 0.83 1.14 0.00 -0.18 0.17 
Standard dev. 5.70 6.18 2.59 5.53 5.44 3.22 2.15 1.84 2.08 
CAPM alpha 1.17*** -0.20 1.36*** 1.26*** 0.09 1.19*** -0.02 -0.22* 0.18 
 (5.67) (-1.04) (9.11) (5.24) (0.51) (5.80) (-0.15) (-1.89) (1.33) 
Fama-French alpha 1.08*** -0.15 1.23*** 1.08*** 0.02 1.08*** 0.03 -0.15 0.16 
 (6.78) (-1.73) (9.17) (5.37) (0.22) (5.48) (0.24) (-1.43) (1.19) 
Carhart alpha 1.38*** -0.10 1.48*** 1.46*** 0.02 1.47*** 0.03 -0.08 0.10 
 (9.93) (-1.14) (12.64) (8.07) (0.17) (8.36) (0.20) (-0.79) (0.72) 
 Young Insiders Old Insiders Young Minus Old 
Panel B: Value weights Buys Sells Buys-Sells Buys Sells Buys-Sells Buys Sells Buys-Sells 
Average returns 1.09 0.58 0.52 1.09 0.70 0.32 -0.02 -0.18 0.21 
Standard dev. 5.21 5.04 2.79 4.94 4.72 3.15 2.87 1.43 3.09 
CAPM alpha 0.30** -0.22** 0.52*** 0.37** -0.02 0.35 -0.04 -0.17 0.18 
 (2.38) (-2.45) (3.09) (2.20) (-0.28) (1.73) (-0.25) (-1.87) (0.89) 
Fama-French alpha 0.26** -0.13 0.39** 0.31* 0.03 0.23 -0.02 -0.15 0.17 
 (2.07) (-1.63) (2.43) (1.86) (0.38) (1.22) (-0.13) (-1.61) (0.84) 
Carhart alpha 0.40*** -0.23*** 0.64*** 0.49*** -0.04 0.49*** -0.03 -0.19 0.22 
 (3.25) (-3.07) (4.22) (3.03) (-0.49) (2.64) (-0.18) (-2.11) (1.05) 
  
 
Table A4: Portfolio Returns to Non-Classified Trades 
 
This table shows the returns to the naïve insider mimicking portfolio (insider purchases minus insider sales) for the sample we employ in this 
paper, as well as for the sample of non-classified trades that do not enter our sample.  The sample period is 1989-2007. A firm is included in the 
buy (sell) portfolio in month (t+1) if any of its insiders bought (sold) on the firm in month t.  At the end of the month (t+1), we rebalance the 
portfolios based on new insider trades. Below are the value-weighted monthly returns to and alphas on these buy and sell portfolios, in 
percentages.  t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Naïve Insider Mimicking Portfolio 
(Buys-Sells) 
  Our universe Non-classified Our Minus Non-classified
Average Value-Weighted Return 0.61 0.37 0.24 
Standard Deviation 4.89 2.32 4.78 
(1.90) (2.43) (0.77) 
CAPM alpha 0.82 0.39 0.43 
(2.61) (2.57) (1.42) 
Fama-French alpha 0.31 0.24 0.07 
(1.19) (1.58) (0.26) 
Carhart alpha 0.28 0.47 -0.20 
(1.09) (2.44) (-0.60) 
  
Table A5: Including Non-Classified Trades in Baseline Regressions 
 
This table reports pooled regressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior month, over our 1989-2007 sample 
period.  The dependent variable in each is future one-month returns.  Opportunistic Buy, Routine Buy, Opportunistic Sell, and Routine Sell are 
categorical variables defined as in Table II.  In Columns 3 and 4, non-classified trades are categorized as opportunistic trades; in Columns 5 and 6, 
non-classified trades are categorized as routine trades.  Controls for the natural logarithm of market equity and book-to-market of the given firm, 
past returns of the given firm over the prior month and prior year (excluding the prior month (t-2,t-12)), and month fixed effects, are included in 
all specifications.  Standard errors clustered at the firm level.  t-statistics are shown below the estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
How Non-classified trades are 
included: 
Non-classified trades not 
included  
Non-classified trades included as 
Opportunistic 
Non-classified trades included as 
Routine 
       
Opportunistic Buy 0.90*** 0.85*** 0.89*** 
(4.64) (5.50) (4.63) 
Routine Buy 0.14 0.03 0.36** 
(0.81) (0.17) (2.43) 
       
Opportunistic Sell -0.78*** -0.72*** -0.81*** 
(-5.67) (-5.10) (-6.48) 
Routine Sell 0.04 0.26* -0.19 
(0.24) (1.90) (-1.44) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 
  
 
Table A6: Correlation Between Routine and Opportunistic Trades, 1989—2007 
 
Pearson correlation coefficients are calculated over all months and over all available stocks for the following variables. # Opportunistic Buys is the 
number of opportunistic buys for the given firm and month, and # Routine Buys is the number of routine buys in the given firm in the given 
month.  These variables are defined analogously for sells.  Log(Size) is the log of market capitalization as of the end of the previous calendar 
month. Log(B/M) the log of the book-market ratio, which is the market value of equity divided by Compustat book value of equity. The timing of 
B/M follows Fama and French (1993) and is as of the previous December year-end. RET is the return in the prior 12 months before the month of 
trading for the given firm and month.  
 
 
# Opportunistic 
Buys
# Routine 
Buys
# Opportunistic 
Sells
# Routine 
Sells Log(Size) Log(B/M) RET
# Opportunistic Buys 1 -0.001 -0.029 -0.016 -0.079 0.066 -0.024
# Routine Buys 1 -0.017 -0.008 -0.039 0.011 0.002
# Opportunistic Sells 1 0.001 0.101 -0.059 0.015
# Routine Sells 1 0.111 -0.091 0.005
Log(Size) 1 -0.436 0.122
Log(B/M) 1 -0.118
RET 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A7: Performance of Routine and Opportunistic Trades,  
Waiting Until 11th Day of Following Month 
 
This table reports pooled regressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the 
prior month, from 1989-2007.  The dependent variable in each is future one-month returns, computed 
from the 11th day of the month subsequent to when insiders trade (i.e., month t+1) to the 10th day of the 
following month (i.e., month t+2).  Routine and opportunistic trades are defined as in Table I.  
Opportunistic Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given 
firm in the prior month (month t), and zero otherwise. Routine Buy is a categorical variable equal to one 
if there were any routine buys on a given firm in the prior month (month t), and zero otherwise.  
Opportunistic Sell and Routine Sell are defined equivalently for insider sales.  Size and BM are the 
natural logarithms of the firm characteristics of market equity and book-to-market of the given firm.  
Past Month (Year) Returns are the return of the given firm over the prior month (year, excluding the 
prior month (t-2,t-12)).  Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated.  Standard errors 
clustered at the firm level.  t-statistics are shown below the estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Opportunistic Buy 1.43*** 1.05*** 1.00***    
 (7.86) (5.39) (5.26)    
Routine Buy 0.88*** 0.35** 0.20    
     (6.07) (2.20) (1.26)    
Opportunistic Sell    -1.46*** -1.04*** -0.90*** 
        (-11.41) (-7.45) (-6.58) 
Routine Sell    -0.59*** -0.11 -0.12 
        (-4.24) (-0.72) (-0.84) 
Size  -0.16*** -0.13***  -0.17*** -0.13*** 
      (-4.19) (-3.34)  (-4.24) (-3.38) 
BM  0.44*** 0.40***  0.44*** 0.40*** 
      (3.93) (3.70)  (3.97) (3.70) 
Past Month Returns  0.01 -0.01  0.01 -0.01 
      (0.82) (-1.59)  (0.89) (-1.51) 
Past Year Returns  0.00 0.00**  0.00 0.00** 
      (0.64) (2.06)  (0.76) (2.15) 
Fixed Effect  Month Month
Number of observations 52,444 48,460 48,460 52,444 48,460 48,460 
  
Table A8: Trade-Weighted Portfolio Returns to Routine and Opportunistic Trades 
This table shows the returns to buy and sell trade-weighted portfolios that follow the routine and opportunistic trades in our opportunistic 
universe from 1989-2007. Opportunistic and routine trades are defined as in Table I.  A firm is included in the opportunistic buy portfolio, for 
example, in month (t+1) if any of its insiders placed an opportunistic buy on the firm in month t.  At the end of the month (t+1), we rebalance 
the portfolios based on new insider trades. Below are the monthly returns to these opportunistic and routine buy and sell portfolios in percentages, 
shown for both equal and value weighting.  Panels A and B shows results for dollar trade-weighted, using self-reported transaction prices and 
CRSP end of day transaction prices, while Panel C shows results using portfolio weights by respective % shares outstanding.  t-statistics are shown 
in parentheses, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Dollar trade-size weighted (using self-reported transaction price from SEC) 
  Opportunistic 
Buys 
Routine 
Buys 
L/S 
Buys 
Opportunistic 
Sells 
Routine 
Sells 
L/S 
Sells 
Opportunistic 
(Buys-Sells) 
Routine 
(Buys-Sells) 
Average returns 2.18 1.50 0.69 0.93 1.50 -0.56 1.25 -0.0002 
Standard dev. 5.75 5.29 5.60 7.75 6.48 5.87 7.55 6.68 
CAPM alpha 1.32*** 0.75** 0.58 -0.15 0.43 -0.58 1.47*** 0.32 
(4.28) (2.42) (1.54) (-0.37) (1.50) (-1.47) (2.97) (0.74) 
Fama-French alpha 1.05*** 0.46 0.59 -0.01 0.67** -0.68* 1.06** -0.20 
(3.66) (1.59) (1.54) (-0.03) (2.52) (-1.69) (2.18) (-0.51) 
Carhart alpha 1.18*** 0.64** 0.54 0.02 0.47* -0.44 1.15** 0.17 
(4.02) (2.16) (1.38) (0.06) (1.75) (-1.09) (2.30) (0.43) 
Panel B: Dollar trade-size weighted (using CRSP end of transaction-day price for transaction price) 
Average returns 2.09 1.45 0.64 0.90 1.45 -0.56 1.20 -0.001 
Standard dev. 5.73 5.26 5.59 7.66 6.40 5.94 7.38 6.60 
CAPM alpha 1.23*** 0.71** 0.52 -0.17 0.40 -0.57 1.40*** 0.31 
(4.02) (2.31) (1.40) (-0.44) (1.41) (-1.44) (2.89) (0.75) 
Fama-French alpha 0.94*** 0.41 0.53 -0.06 0.61** -0.67** 1.01** -0.19 
(3.37) (1.43) (1.40) (-0.16) (2.30) (-1.65) (2.10) (-0.49) 
Carhart alpha 1.09*** 0.58** 0.51 0.01 0.42 -0.41 1.08** 0.16 
(3.83) (1.98) (1.31) (0.03) (1.58) (-0.99) (2.19) (0.41) 
Panel C: Percentage shares outstanding weighted 
Average returns 2.09 2.02 0.07 0.90 1.75 -0.85 1.20 0.27 
Standard dev. 5.63 5.72 5.60 8.00 6.71 5.79 7.86 6.45 
CAPM alpha 1.29*** 1.24*** 0.06 -0.24 0.70** -0.94** 1.53*** 0.53 
(4.06) (3.74) (0.15) (-0.60) (2.21) (-2.44) (3.04) (1.28) 
Fama-French alpha 1.02*** 0.96*** 0.06 -0.10 0.87*** -0.96** 1.12** 0.09 
(3.41) (3.19) (0.16) (-0.28) (3.06) (-2.45) (2.30) (0.23) 
Carhart alpha 1.15*** 1.24*** -0.09 0.07 0.75** -0.68* 1.09** 0.49 
(3.76) (4.13) (-0.22) (0.18) (2.59) (-1.72) (2.16) (1.23) 
  
 
Table A9: Impact of the Number of Routine and Opportunistic Trades  
 
This table reports panel regressions of returns on continuous measures of the number of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior month, from 
1989-2007. The dependent variable in each is future one-month returns (RET).  Routine and opportunistic trades are defined as in Table I.  
Number of Opportunistic Buys is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of opportunistic buys in the given firm for the prior 
month (so is equal to zero if there were zero trades).  Number of Routine Buys is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of routine 
buys in the given firm for the prior month (so is equal to zero if there were zero trades).  Number of Opportunistic Sells and Number of Routine 
Sells are defined equivalently for insider sales.  Size and BM are the natural logarithms of the firm characteristics of market equity and book-to-
market of the given firm.  Past Returns are the return of the given firm over the prior sixth month period.  Month fixed effects (Month) are 
included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are 
included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number of Opportunistic Buys 0.95*** 0.74*** 0.66***    0.67*** 0.61*** 0.59*** 
     (6.77) (4.97) (4.56)    (4.52) (3.97) (3.93) 
Number of Routine Buys 0.39*** 0.10 0.01    0.14 -0.02 -0.05 
     (4.09) (0.92) (0.12)    (1.37) (-0.16) (-0.43) 
Number of Opportunistic Sells    -0.63*** -0.43*** -0.31*** -0.49*** -0.35*** -0.25*** 
        (-10.29) (-6.75) (-4.97) (-7.36) (-5.21) (-3.70) 
Number of Routine Sells    -0.24*** 0.01 0.07 -0.12* 0.07 0.12 
        (-3.64) (0.17) (0.97) (-1.75) (0.99) (1.64) 
Size  -0.24*** -0.20***  -0.24*** -0.22***  -0.22*** -0.20*** 
      (-5.43) (-4.71)  (-5.66) (-5.17)  (-5.18) (-4.71) 
BM  0.39*** 0.39***  0.40*** 0.42***  0.38*** 0.39*** 
      (3.39) (3.52)  (3.49) (3.69)  (3.31) (3.51) 
Past Month Returns  -0.03*** -0.05***  -0.03*** -0.05***  -0.03*** -0.05*** 
      (-4.05) (-6.14)  (-4.00) (-6.10)  (-3.92) (-6.04) 
Past Year Returns  0.00*** 0.01***  0.00*** 0.01***  0.01*** 0.01*** 
     
 (3.67) (4.71)  (3.73) (4.75)  (3.82) (4.79) 
Fixed Effect Month Month Month
Number of observations 52,444 48,460 48,460 52,444 48,460 48,460 52,444 48,460 48,460 
  
Table A10: Performance of Routine and Opportunistic Trades across Exchanges 
 
This table reports pooled regressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the 
prior month, across various exchanges.  The sample period is 1989-2007.  The dependent variable in each 
is future one-month returns (RET).  Routine and opportunistic trades are defined as in Table I.  
Opportunistic Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given 
firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise. Routine Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there 
were any routine buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise.  Opportunistic Sell and 
Routine Sell are defined equivalently for insider sales.  Columns 1 and 2 show regressions run on the full 
sample across all exchanges (these are identical to Columns 3 and 6 of Table II).  Columns 2 and 3 show 
regression run only on the subsample of NYSE stocks, while Columns 5 and 6 show regressions run only 
the subsample of NASDAQ stocks.  Size and BM are the natural logarithms of the firm characteristics of 
market equity and book-to-market of the given firm.  Past Month (Year) Returns are the return of the 
given firm over the prior month (year, excluding the prior month (t-2,t-12)).  Month fixed effects (Month) 
are included where indicated.  Standard errors clustered at the firm level.  t-statistics are shown below the 
estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Baseline from paper
(Across all exchanges) 
NYSE stocks only NASDAQ stocks only 
Opportunistic Buy 0.90***  1.21***  0.75**  
 (4.64)  (3.78)  (2.25)  
Routine Buy 0.14  0.62**  0.07  
     (0.81)  (2.42)  (0.25)  
Opportunistic Sell  -0.78***   -0.84***  -0.81*** 
      (-5.67)   (-4.11)  (-3.47) 
Routine Sell  0.04   -0.33  0.23 
      (0.24)   (-1.61)  (0.91) 
Size -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.15** -0.16*** -0.32*** -0.34*** 
     (-4.55) (-4.70) (-2.53) (-2.60) (-3.42) (-3.64) 
BM 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.21 0.26* 0.29 0.27 
     (3.30) (3.42) (1.45) (1.79) (1.44) (1.35) 
Past Month Returns -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.02* -0.02* -0.05*** -0.05*** 
     (-6.09) (-6.03) (-1.67) (-1.66) (-4.71) (-4.66) 
Past Year Returns 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*** 0.01*** 
     (4.71) (4.80) (1.90) (1.84) (3.06) (3.20) 
Fixed Effect Month Month Month Month Month Month
Number of observations 48,460 48,460 14,021 14,021 21,558 21,558 
  
Table A11: Robustness Checks 
 
This table reports pooled regressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior month, from 1989-2007.  The 
dependent variable in each is future one-month returns (RET).  Routine and opportunistic trades are defined as in Table I.  Opportunistic Buy is 
a categorical variable equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise. Routine Buy is a 
categorical variable equal to one if there were any routine buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise.  Opportunistic Sell and 
Routine Sell are defined equivalently for insider sales.  Size and BM are the natural logarithms of market equity and book-to-market of the given 
firm.  Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) include only stocks in the top (bottom) half of the market capitalization distribution, where market cap is 
measured in December of the prior year.  Columns 5 and 6 (7 and 8) include only stocks in the top (bottom) half of the distribution of fraction of 
shares outstanding traded by insiders in the prior year.  Columns 9 and 10 (11 and 12) include only those trades made within (outside) a 21-day 
trading window (+3 to +24 days) after an earnings announcement, while also excluding (including) any trades that occur up to 30 days before an 
M&A announcement.  Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated.  Standard errors clustered at the firm level.  t-statistics are 
shown below the estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Large Stocks Small Stocks 
High Intensity 
Stocks 
Low Intensity 
Stocks 
Non-Blackout Only Blackout Only 
Opportunistic Buy 0.55**  0.80*** 1.27*** 0.56** 1.28*** 0.85***
 (2.31)  (2.78)  (4.14)  (2.36)  (3.81)  (3.69)  
Routine Buy 0.08  -0.01 0.46* -0.17 0.34 0.14
     (0.37)  (-0.05)  (1.69)  (-0.80)  (1.25)  (0.70)  
Opportunistic Sell  -0.55*** -0.83*** -1.13***  -0.39** -0.99*** -0.78*** 
      (-3.44)  (-3.29)  (-5.45)  (-2.13)  (-4.43)  (-4.65) 
Routine Sell  0.11 0.11 -0.03  0.07 -0.21 0.08
      (0.62)  (0.37)  (-0.14)  (0.36)  (-0.90)  (0.45) 
Size -0.08 -0.08 -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.11 -0.11* -0.22*** -0.23*** 
     (-1.34) (-1.43) (-3.54) (-3.50) (-3.10) (-3.28) (-2.73) (-2.78) (-1.57) (-1.72) (-4.27) (-4.43) 
BM 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.23 0.22 0.34** 0.37** 0.39** 0.39** 0.37* 0.39** 0.40*** 0.42*** 
     (3.06) (3.27) (1.26) (1.18) (2.14) (2.33) (2.44) (2.41) (1.94) (2.04) (3.10) (3.22) 
Past Month Returns -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
     (-2.87) (-2.77) (-5.62) (-5.61) (-4.45) (-4.38) (-4.46) (-4.43) (-2.84) (-2.81) (-6.60) (-6.57) 
Past Year Returns 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.01 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
     (4.98) (5.06) (2.21) (2.30) (4.69) (4.81) (1.39) (1.41) (2.63) (2.65) (3.35) (3.42) 
Fixed Effect Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month 
Number of observations 26,543 26,543 21,927 21,927 26,345 26,345 22,115 22,115 17,594 17,594 36,605 36,605 
  
Table A12: Predicting News Events with Opportunistic Buys and Sells Separately 
 
This table reports panel regressions of information events on the number of routine and opportunistic 
buys and sells in a company in the prior month, from 1989-2007. The dependent variables in the 
regressions are: in Columns 1-3, a proxy for firm information environment in month t+1 using the 
number of news, annual and quarterly earnings forecast revisions, recommendation changes, SEO and 
M&A activities (All Firm Info), in Columns 4-6, solely the number of news in month t+1 (News).   The 
main independent variables of interest are the Number of Opportunistic Buys, the Number of 
Opportunistic Sells, the Number of Routine Buys, and the Number of Routine Sells, each defined as the 
logarithm of one plus the number of trades of a given type, made in the prior month (month t). Past 
Month News is equal to the number of information events (for each respective specification of information 
events) observed for the given firm in the prior month (month t), while Past 6 Month News is defined 
equivalently for information events of the firm in the 6 months prior to last month.  The other 
independent variables are defined in Table II.  Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated. 
All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered standard 
errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance 
are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Type of Information: All Firm Info All Firm Info All Firm Info News News News
Number of Opportunistic Sells 0.26*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.26*** 0.03*** 0.04***
     (8.18) (2.54) (2.37) (7.09) (2.85) (3.31) 
Number of Opportunistic Buys -0.08** 0.02 0.03** 0.00 0.02* 0.02**
     (-2.49) (1.58) (2.40) (0.13) (1.69) (2.01) 
Number of Routine Sells  0.31*** 0.03* 0.02 0.26*** 0.02 0.02
     (6.63) (1.72) (1.58) (4.49) (1.41) (1.33) 
Number of Routine Buys -0.11*** -0.04** 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.00
     (-3.17) (-2.29) (0.35) (-1.50) (-1.10) (0.05) 
Size  0.09*** 0.03***   0.02*** 0.02***
      (15.87) (7.86)   (4.87) (4.66) 
BM  -0.03** -0.01   -0.03*** -0.01
      (-2.42) (-1.37)   (-2.93) (-1.01) 
Past Month Returns  -0.00** 0.00***   -0.00 0.00***
      (-2.02) (2.77)   (-0.97) (3.76) 
Past Year Returns  0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00
       (0.44) (1.12)   (1.30) (1.09) 
Past Month News  0.58*** 0.22***   0.72*** 0.28***
  (39.76) (19.36)   (54.63) (18.86) 
Past 6 Month News  0.46***     0.39***
       (19.36)     (65.62) 
Fixed Effect  Month Month  Month Month
Number of observations 22,071 20,198 20,198 22,071 20,198 20,198
  
 
Exhibit A1: Hypothetical Example, and  
Notes on Opportunistic Insider Classification Scheme 
 
 
Assume you had insider Bob trade in March of 1987, 1988, and 1989 (and no other trades in those 
years). And here are his trades for 1990 and 1991: 
  
1.       January 1990 
2.       March 1990 
3.       Dec 1990 
4.       Jan 1991 
  
In the main tables of our paper (i.e., everything except Table III), the “routine” trades are trades 
made by an insider who has had three consecutive calendar years with trades in the same month in 
the past. In the example above, insider Bob is routine. We would classify all his trades (1 through 4) 
as those made by a routine insider, and they would enter our tests as routine.  In Table III, in our 
trade-level analysis, we took a slightly different approach. We wanted to differentiate trades that are 
made in the same month as the month that established an insider as routine from trades that the 
insider made in other (non-routine) months. In the example above, Bob is routine because he traded 
in March in three consecutive years. In Table III, all his subsequent March trades (i.e., trade 2) 
would be classified as routine. However, trades that Bob makes in months other than March (i.e., 
trades 1, 3, and 4) would be opportunistic in the context of Table III. 
 
Some other notes about our classification scheme are as follows.  In the results we report in the 
main tables (e.g., Table II), once a trader becomes routine, he is classified as routine for all of his 
subsequent trades, regardless of what trading behavior (or lack of trading behavior) takes place after 
his initial three-year classification period.  We have experimented with different permutations here, 
e.g., only using the most recent three-year lagged trading behavior to define routine traders each 
year, and the results are very similar to those reported here (see Appendix Table A1).  Finally, in all 
of our main results we do check the past three-years of trading for all opportunistic traders each 
year, so they can “become” a routine trader at any point.  In which case, the opportunistic trader 
would become a routine trader if he traded in the same calendar month in the past three years, and 
then stay as a routine trader from that point onward as mentioned above. 
 
